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Abstract 
There are at least two types of response to stimuli: an automatic response that 
happens before conscious thought (a Type 1 response) and a deliberative, intentional 
response (a Type 2 response).  These responses are related to behavior associated with 
the affective loading of the stimulus presented.  Prior research has shown, for example, 
that a Type 1 tendency to spend more time looking at fear-provoking stimuli is associated 
with higher levels of general anxiety, while a Type 2 tendency to spend more time 
looking away from happy faces is associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms.  
Some stimuli categories elicit mixed responses, indicated by discrepant Type 1 and Type 
2 responses.  For example, alcoholics in recovery tend to look toward alcohol-themed 
pictures in the first 200 milliseconds, then look away.  This suggests that alcoholics in 
recovery have an automatic draw to alcohol that is overridden by the conscious 
application of a cognitive schema to avoid alcohol.  Sexual response studies to date have 
measured Type 1 and Type 2 responses separately; however, no study has yet measured 
both types of response within the same person.  This study was the first to examine both 
Type 1 and Type 2 responses to erotic stimuli within the same individual as a test of 
within-individual variation of attentional responses to sexual stimuli. Results do not 
support a connection between either attentional bias or conflicting Type 1 and Type 2 
responses and sexual desire or distress.  Implications of these non-findings are discussed 
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Responses to sexual stimuli are many and complex, including physiological, 
cognitive and emotional responses (Adams, Haynes, & Brayer, 1985; Bancroft & 
Janssen, 2000; Janssen, Everaerd, Spiering, & Janssen, 2000; Prause, Janssen, & Hetrick, 
2008; Wiegel, Scepkowski, & Barlow, 2007).  Some of these responses happen without 
conscious awareness or control, and others are deliberate, occurring with intentional 
thought.  Responses also vary in timing, occurring from a few milliseconds to several 
minutes after stimulus presentation.  Usually, although not always, automatic responses 
happen more quickly than deliberative ones (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  The cognitive 
research literature has labeled these automatic, relatively fast responses as Type 1, and 
deliberative, generally slower responses as Type 2 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich 
& Toplak, 2012). Attentional bias, or a pattern of shifting attention toward (approach) or 
away from (avoidance) a category of stimuli, such as ‘alcohol-related,’ ‘anxiety-
provoking,’ or ‘erotic,’ can occur with both Type 1 and Type 2 responses (Bancroft, 
Graham, Janssen, & Sanders, 2009; Janssen et al., 2000; Prause et al., 2008).  Both 
response types have been studied in a variety of domains, including willpower (Metcalfe 
& Mischel, 1999), anxiety (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), depression (Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004), and substance use (Ehrman et al., 2002), but 
remain less understood in the context of sexual arousal.  
Few studies have explored Type 1 and Type 2 responses in the same person in 
any affective domain, and none have explored Type 1 and Type 2 congruence in response 
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to erotic stimuli.  In the few instances in which both response types have been studied in 
person, the results have proved interesting.  For example, in substance-craving 
participants in recovery, a Type 1 approach response was observed to be paired with a 
Type 2 neutral response (Stormark, Field, Hugdahl, & Horowitz, 1997).  The conflict 
between response types was not seen in participants who were still active substance users 
(Type 1 and Type 2 responses were both approach responses, indicating an attentional 
bias toward the stimulus) or those who were not substance dependent (Type 1 and Type 2 
responses were either avoidant or neutral, measured as an attentional bias away from the 
stimulus or the absence of such bias).   
In that study, having different Type 1 and Type 2 responses to the same stimuli 
was seen as evidence of conflicting drives (Stormark et al., 1997), with one drive 
dominating the Type 1 response (an automatic craving response) and another dominating 
the Type 2 response (the application of a conscious schema of avoidance). That two-
drive, automatic/deliberative distinction has not yet been demonstrated with sexual 
stimuli.  Evidence of a single person having different Type 1 and Type 2 responses to 
sexual stimuli would suggest that, as with substance-specific stimuli, the two different 
responses are capturing two distinct (and conflicting) aspects of a person’s reaction to 
erotic stimulation.  This study will (1) demonstrate that the technique used to identify 
differing Type 1 and Type 2 responses to substance cravings can be applied to sexual 
arousal, and (2) explore the implications of the conflicting drives implied by having 
different Type 1 and Type 2 responses to sexual stimuli. 
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Defining and measuring Type 1 and Type 2 responses 
The most recent review of dual-type (previously described as dual-process) 
theories posits that very few features necessarily distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 
responses.  Automatic, or Type 1 responses (1) do not require working memory, and (2) 
always occur given a sufficient stimulus.  Deliberate, or Type 2 responses, on the other 
hand, do require working memory and include the creation of multiple representations of 
mental objects for simulation purposes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich, 2009; 
Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  Broadly, then, theoretical models define Type 1 responses 
as automatic, reflexive reactions to stimuli that require (or benefit from) an immediate 
response (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1989), such as 
threatening stimuli, or stimuli that suggest an imminent mating opportunity.  Type 2 
responses are those that require active mental simulation and representation, and the 
deliberative application of cognitive schemas (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Öhman et al., 
1989; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012), such as intentional decisions about what strategies to 
apply to a threatening situation, or whether to take advantage of a sexual opportunity.  
Cognitive schema, as defined by Beck and Beck (2011, p. 33), are “hypothesized mental 
structure[s] that [organize] information,” and can be core beliefs, intermediate beliefs, 
such as rules attitudes and assumptions, or automatic thoughts.  Schema at any of the 
three levels may interact with the erotic stimuli to alter Type 2 responses (see Figure 1 for 
a theoretical model). 
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There are a number of common correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 responses that 
are found in some (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012), but not all 
(Kruglanski, 2013; Osman, 2013) empirical studies.  Type 1 responses are frequently 
thought to reflect underlying bias, premised on the idea that they occur too quickly for an 
automatic bias to be inhibited (Epstein, 1994), while Type 2 responses are believed to 
reflect a more thoughtful, intentional, and rational response.  The absolute form of this 
distinction (in which Type 1 responses are always fast and Type 2 responses are never 
biased) has been rejected in more recent work that points to the variation of these 
responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kruglanski, 2013).  For example, the Type 1 
responses may be more likely to reflect underlying biases, but it may be the case that a 
Type 2 response reflects an underlying bias more than a Type 1 response in some 
circumstances. 
Alternate terminology. Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) used the terminology ‘hot’ 
and ‘cold’ to describe  fast, automatic, affective reactions (hot) and slow, conscious ones 
(cold). The hot/cold literature that largely regarded ‘hot’ Type 1 responses as always fast, 
and ‘cold’ Type 2 responses as always slow has been questioned as of late (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013).  These older terms map broadly and incompletely onto the more recent 
uncoupling of reaction time with response type. Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) work – 
originally presented as a model of self-control – also presumes that the hot response is 
affective in nature, and that the cold response is inherently cognitive and ‘thoughtful,’ 
distinctions that the Type 1 and Type 2 framework does not require. Despite the outdated 
assumptions of these terms, the research and theory done within the hot/cold framework 
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has provided useful information on the underlying processes of responses to a wide 
variety of stimuli, including response to sexual arousal.  
Type 1 responses as context for Type 2 responses.  Given that the Type 1 
response usually occur before the Type 2 response to the same stimuli, the results of a 
Type 1 appraisal are generally available to the Type 2 response processes as context or 
input (Janssen et al., 2000; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  Thus an 
immediate fear reaction to a threatening stimulus may produce an increase in skin 
conductance and a rise in heart rate.  When the Type 2 response appraisal processes are 
activated, those processes have as input not only the stimulus itself, but also the 
physiological reaction to that stimulus.  For example, an immediate physiological 
reaction of pupil dilation in response to an erotic stimulus becomes part of the context in 
which that stimulus is appraised consciously (Janssen et al., 2000).  Thus a Type 2 
reaction to erotic stimuli is a reaction not only to the stimulus itself but to one’s own 
Type 1 responses to that stimulus, and reflects the combined effect of a general attitude 
toward sexuality as well as an attitude toward one’s own physical experience of sexual 
arousal.  
Physiological responses are generally identified as Type 1 responses, and seen as 
a context for Type 2 responses.  For example, an acoustic startle response in the context 
of affective reactions is the extent to which, in response to an unexpected white noise, the 
participant flinches or blinks (Jansen & Frijda, 1994), and is commonly assessed by 
electromyographic measurement of the speed and intensity of the blinking response.  As 
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described in Fillion, Dawson and Schell (1998), startle reflexes, including the acoustic 
startle response, are decreased with greater positive affective activation and increased 
with greater negative affective activation.  Thus a reliable method of assessing the 
affective valence of a stimulus is to induce a startle response, since a positive emotional 
reaction will be associated with less of a reflexive ‘flinch’ (Skolnick & Davidson, 2002).  
Other research (Giargiari, Mahaffey, Craighead, & Hutchison, 2005; Jansen & Frijda, 
1994; 2000) found that the acoustic startle response was weaker when participants were 
shown erotic film clips, but that this effect reduced as the film clips were repeated, 
suggesting both that there was a positive affective response to the erotic films and that 
repeated viewings were less appetitive and engaging. 
Further work found that participants with lower levels of sexual desire (as 
measured by the Sexual Desire Inventory; Spector, Carey, & Steinberg, 1996) showed 
less of a suppression of the startle response after erotic images than those with higher 
levels of sexual desire (Giargiari et al., 2005), which the authors theorize is supportive of 
the idea that people with lower levels of desire have diminished physiological reactions 
to sexual stimuli.  This effect was also shown by a similar effect on prepulse inhibition.  
Prepulse inhibition refers to the response-minimizing effect that presentation of sound 
has immediately prior to the acoustic startle stimulus (Postma, Kumari, Hines, & Gray, 
2001).  That is, after training, the presentation of a burst of white noise immediately prior 
to the presentation of the supraliminal white noise has the effect of reducing the strength 
of the ‘flinch’ response.  After being shown erotic images, participants lower in sexual 
desire showed a diminished prepulse inhibition effect (Postma et al., 2001).  This study is 
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suggestive of a stronger emotional response generally being associated with greater 
prepulse inhibition. 
Type 1 physiological responses form a context input for Type 2 responses.  This 
means that a Type 1 response that occurs quickly must be considered when understanding 
the nature of a Type 2 response to the same stimuli that occur slowly.  For example, an 
automatic negative appraisal to an unexpected presentation of an erotic stimulus may 
shade the slower Type 2 response by tingeing an otherwise sex-positive response with an 
element of shock. 
Measurement of attentional biases.  The majority of the research examining 
responses to affectively-laden stimuli has used a dot probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986) to 
assess Type 1 and Type 2 attentional bias responses to stimuli.  In the dot probe task, two 
images (or, less frequently, words) are presented to the left and right of visual center.  
The stimuli remain for a variable amount of time, ranging from the subliminal 17 
milliseconds to the (very) supraliminal 2000 milliseconds.  The stimuli are then replaced 
with a dot, which appears where one of the two stimuli were.  Participants are asked to 
specify whether the dot appears on the left or right side of the image.  Since a participant 
whose gaze lingers on one type of image more than another will detect the dot that 
appears behind that image faster, lower response times when the probe dot is presented 
behind an image of a particular category means the participant preferentially gazed at 
images in that category over the timeframe of the presentation.  This approach has been 
used extensively to explore attentional bias with both Type 1 and Type 2 responses.  This 
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paradigm was developed in part as a response to the Emotional Stroop task (Ehlers, 
Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & 
Eysenck, 1992; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & 
Trezise, 1986), which asks participants to name the ink color of emotionally-charged 
words (e.g., ‘spider’ or ‘web’ when presented to people afraid of spiders).  The time it 
takes to identify the color, when compared to the time required to name the color of non-
affectively-laden words, is interpreted as either an attentional bias toward that word 
category or a stronger general emotional response.  Since the test was unable to 
distinguish between the two, the dot probe task was developed to isolate attention from 
pure affective activation (MacLeod et al., 1986).  Since the dot probe task allows for the 
presentation of either words or images, it has seen far greater use in the attentional bias 
framework than has the emotional Stroop task.   Although some dot probe tasks use 
subliminal presentation of stimuli to capture Type 1 responses (MacLeod & Mathews, 
1988; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992), other studies which also identify both Type 1 and 
Type 2 responses use stimuli presented at no faster than 200 ms., which is supraliminal 
(Cox, Hogan, Kristian, & Race, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2006).  To capture two different 
types of responses, then, a gap in speed is required between the fast Type 1 and the 
slower Type 2, but research suggests that the faster stimulus need not be subliminal. 
Type 1 and Type 2 responses and attentional biases across domains 
As described above, an attentional bias is an unconscious, automatic tendency to 
spend more time looking at (or avoiding looking at) stimuli of a particular category 
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(MacLeod et al., 1986).  An attentional bias is not generally the subject of conscious 
awareness, and is believed to represent underlying low-level informational processing 
tendencies (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; MacLeod et al., 1986).  These low-level 
processes are often described in evolutionary terms as processes that require fast action to 
ensure survival.  Since fast action is required, the external stimulus triggers a necessary 
and automatic response: the same stimulus will produce the same category of response, at 
least until habituation.  The response need not be binary; it could, instead, be a tendency 
– a tendency, for example, to spend more time looking at threatening stimuli than neutral 
stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  Attentional biases have been associated with a 
broad range of correlates (Mogg & Bradley, 2006), such as anxiety disorders (MacLeod 
et al., 1986), substance use (such as alcohol, Cox et al., 2002; and nicotine, Ehrman et al., 
2002), phobias (Mogg & Bradley, 2006), and, to a lesser extent, depression (Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010).  
Work on attentional bias is premised on the idea that biases in information 
processing that occur soon after the stimulus is presented have a significant effect on a 
person’s experience and interpretation of the world (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  The 
often-posited mechanism of action is that these attentional biases shift our internal 
emotional experiences by shifting our external experience of the world.  Specifically, 
more attention paid to stimuli associated with a particular category or emotional 
response, such as anxiety, sadness, or sexual arousal, is expected to increase the average 
frequency with which one experiences that emotion.  A tendency to spend more time 
looking at anxiety-provoking stimuli, for example, is expected to be an indication of 
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higher levels of anxiety since looking at anxiety-provoking stimuli provokes anxiety 
(MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  The interestingly circular 
pattern behind the argument is that those people who are high in trait anxiety place 
greater automatic salience on fearful stimuli, and thus focus on those stimuli – and that 
focus, in turn, increases state anxiety (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). 
Research on the physiological response to erotic images has found that the 
subliminal presentation of erotic images can alter genital arousal (Janssen et al., 2000; 
Ponseti & Bosinski, 2010)i.  Importantly, this same line of research has shown a different 
effect of stimuli when presented quickly and slowly.  For example, Janssen, Spiering, 
Everaerd and Janssen (2000) found that in men, the facilitative effect of a sexual prime 
was negatively correlated to the accessibility of that prime. That is, the more the 
participant reported being aware of seeing an erotic prime, the less effective it was in 
reducing identification time for a later erotic image. 
Duration of stimulus presentation matters in attention bias research.  
Different affective domains have different stimulus presentation speeds at which the bias 
is observable.  For example, while anxiety-provoking stimuli are sufficient to 
demonstrate an attentional bias in people high in anxiety if presented subliminally, sad 
faces are preferred to happy faces by dysthymic participants only if the faces are 
presented slowly enough to be supraliminal (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mogg, 
Bradley, & Williams, 1995).  Other work specifically tested whether words associated 
with depression or anxiety would produce a bias effect if presented sub- or supra-
11 
liminally, and found an effect only for the supraliminal presentation (Bradley, Mogg, & 
Lee, 1997). This effect has been explained in the context of the evolutionary function of 
anxiety and depression, with anxiety conceptualized as the avoidance of danger and 
depression as inspiring the discontinuation of the pursuit of failed goals (Oatley & 
Johnson-laird, 1987). 
In that evolutionary context, a rapid, subliminal bias for anxiety-provoking stimuli 
would reflect a stronger orientation toward threat in order to identify and react to a 
threatening stimulus, such as a tiger, while depression would be unlikely to be as salient 
as rapidly, since goal discontinuation does not require decisions that are as rapid.  Other 
work on an attentional bias associated with depression has posited that depressed people 
may be engaging in active thought suppression, which is blocking the detection of the 
effect.  By inducing a cognitive load while probing for attentional bias – by way of a 
word search grid – researchers found evidence of an attentional effect.  Participants who 
had previously experienced a depressive episode demonstrated a bias toward negative 
words comparable to that shown in currently dysthymic participants when under a 
cognitive load, but not when not under the cognitive load.  This, the researchers theorize, 
is indicative of active thought suppression which is disrupted by the word search grid 
(Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001).  That work, however, does not 
preclude the possibility that it was the speed of presentation of their materials and not the 
cognitive load that allowed for the effect to be identified.  Future research will be needed 
to clarify whether the effect is related to speed of presentation or cognitive load. 
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Cognitive bias detection methodologies have been applied to substance use (Field, 
Munafò, & Franken, 2009) and addictive behaviors (Van Holst et al., 2012).  The 
duration of presentation of substance stimuli is again important.  In one study (Stormark 
et al., 1997), alcohol or neutral words were presented, followed by a probe that was either 
behind the word presented (valid, in the terminology of the study) or not behind the word 
presented (invalid).  The length of time it took to indicate which side the probe appeared 
on was measured, with shorter reaction times for invalid trials (in which the probe was 
not behind the category-relevant word) being suggestive of the participant looking toward 
the word, and longer reaction times for valid trials (in which the probe was behind the 
category-relevant word) suggesting the participant was looking away from the word.  
With short presentation of words (100 ms; not subliminal), alcoholics showed slower 
response times on invalid trials than social drinkers, which suggests that the alcoholics 
were more attentionally ‘captured’ by the alcohol words than the social drinkers were.  
However, with a longer presentation time (500 ms), this pattern reversed, with alcoholics 
showing faster response times on invalid trials than social drinkers, suggesting that, given 
the time for cognitive processing, alcoholics, more than social drinkers, would look away 
from alcohol words.  The findings of Stormark et al. (1997) have been replicated with 
even shorter (although still not generally considered subliminal) duration exposure times 
of 50 ms (Noël et al., 2006).  Additional work has found that much longer exposures 
(2000 ms) tend to ‘capture’ the attention of untreated heavy social drinkers (Field, Mogg, 
Zetteler, & Bradley, 2004), but not of non-drinkers.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that different durations of exposure are measuring different responses.  In this case, the 
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authors theorized that the shorter exposures of 50 or 100 ms were accessing attentional 
preferences before the participant had a chance to use avoidance strategies.  Given time 
to implement avoidance strategies, the attentional bias is weakened or eliminated (Field 
& Cox, 2008; Noël et al., 2006; Stormark et al., 1997).  Thus, in the case of substance 
use, the duration of presentation of affectively-laden stimuli determines the effect being 
measured, which is another example of a fast/automatic process producing a different end 
result than a slow/cognitively-mediated process. The importance of the length of stimuli 
presentation could therefore reveal important information on the effects of cognitive 
processes employed to suppress automatic responses.  The length of stimulus presentation 
on sexual responses could thus reveal important information on the way in which humans 
process sexual stimuli. 
Sexual arousal and Type 1 and Type 2 responses. Sexual arousal is a complex, 
multifaceted phenomenon, consisting of a physiological genital response and a subjective 
or psychological response, either or both of which may be associated with behavior 
change (Bancroft et al., 2009; Bancroft & Janssen, 2000; Janssen, 2011; Janssen & 
Bancroft, 2007).  This approach to sexual arousal is consistent with understandings of 
other emotions (Frijda, 1988, 1993; LeDoux, 1995) and appetitive drives (Stormark et al., 
1997), in that it includes both an objective, and subjective or psychological (Ekman, 
1993) component.  Thus, sexual arousal – like other emotional responses – can be 
explored using a variety of techniques and within a variety of frameworks, including the 
Type 1/Type 2 attentional bias distinction described above. 
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Type 1 and Type 2 responses to erotic images have been explored in a variety of 
studies.  First in men (Spiering, Everaerd, & Janssen, 2003) and then in women (Spiering, 
Everaerd, Karsdorp, Both, & Brauer, 2006), evidence was found that it is possible to 
produce an automatic and objectively observable sexual response to a subliminally-
presented sexual image. The researchers tested whether an automatic identification of the 
image as sexual had occurred by measuring the time it took to identify an image 
presented immediately after the subliminal image as sexual.  That is, the study explored 
whether a subliminal presentation of an erotic stimuli would activate the sexual meaning 
network.  This was determined by the time it took to identify a subsequent stimulus as 
either sexual or neutral (i.e., whether the image was erotic or of a plant).  For both men 
and women, researchers found that a subliminal sexual prime reduced the time it took to 
identify a subsequent image as erotic, despite the absence of conscious awareness of 
having seen the original, subliminally-presented erotic image (Spiering et al., 2003, 
2006).  This is consistent with other work that has found a similar effect with other 
affectively-loaded stimuli (Schacter & Badgaiyan, 2001).  This effect meets Greenwald, 
Klinger and Schuh’s (1995) evidentiary criteria for establishing that unconscious or 
automatic cognition has occurred, since an unconscious influence is observed in the 
absence of a consciously reported effect.  Thus this evidence is consistent with the idea 
that non-conscious processing of erotically-charged stimuli does occur. 
In addition to establishing that automatic processing of erotic stimuli occurs, 
studies also identified gender differences in the way these stimuli are interpreted when 
presented in such a way as to allow conscious cognitive processing.  These gender 
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differences are of particular interest since experimental presentation of non-conscious 
stimuli (e.g., Spiering et al., 2003, 2006) did not show meaningful gender differences in 
effect.  In these experiments, a distinction was made between ‘male-oriented’ and 
‘female-oriented’ erotic stimuli (Spiering & Laan, 2004).  ‘Male-oriented’ images include 
“heterosexual couples engaged in oral or genital sexual activity…with genitals of both 
sexes clearly visible” (Spiering & Laan, 2004, p. 373).  The ‘female-oriented’ images 
showed “heterosexual couples making love as well as masturbating women.  
Characteristics of this category are: female’s [sic] enjoyment, a general positive 
atmosphere, a pleasant background… and genitals not explicitly in focus” (Spiering & 
Laan, 2004, p. 373).  Of particular note is that the ‘male-oriented’ stimuli were effective 
in activating sexual meaning when presented subliminally to both men and women, while 
women-oriented stimuli were not subliminally effective in activating sexually-related 
meaning in either men or women, although women did report greater subjective sexual 
arousal when the ‘female-oriented’ stimuli were presented consciously.  That is, the 
male-oriented images produced an automatic response in both men and women, despite 
the fact that the female participants reported greater subjective arousal in response to the 
female-oriented stimuli, which suggests that, in addition to a within-person difference 
between automatic and conscious processing, there may be gender differences in the 
cognitive processing of erotic stimuli that are highlighted by using both subliminal and 
supraliminal presentation of stimuli. 
These studies clearly demonstrate that there is an important distinction between 
responses to erotic stimuli when presented fast versus when presented slowly, and that 
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the timing of presentation seems to have important gender differences.  Other work has 
extended these differences to look at how they map onto erotophobia and erotophilia.  
Erotophobia/erotophilia is operationalized as a single-axis scale measuring affective 
valence in response to sexual cues (Fisher, White, Byrne, & Kelley, 1988), and can 
broadly be considered a measure of how positive an individual feels toward sexuality.  
Macapagal and Janssen (2011) found that erotophobia/erotophilia did not predict the 
extent to which unconsciously presented erotic stimuli reduced the time it took to identify 
a later image as erotic, which supports the idea that the erotophobia/erotophilia 
distinction is a conscious one.  In prior research, erotophilia has sometimes been 
described as an automatic approach/avoidance stance applied specifically to sex (Byrne, 
Fisher, Lamberth, & Mitchell, 1974), in the same way that a phobia is a bias toward 
avoidance, or an unconscious preference is a bias toward approach.  Other work has 
characterized erotophilia as a personality trait (Fisher et al., 1988), or an explicit set of 
relatively fixed cognitive patterns associated with a “readiness to act in a certain way.”  
This evidence is consistent with its characterization as a personality trait since its 
influence is felt relatively slowly, compared to the rapid activation of arousal by 
subliminal stimuli. 
Macapagal and Janssen (2011) further found that amongst those high in 
erotophobia, priming with erotic stimuli produced faster identification  of subliminally-
presented images with  a negative affective valence (such as frightening or disturbing 
pictures), which is consistent with erotic stimuli being associated with negative affect for 
those high in erotophobia.  Interestingly, they also found that those high in erotophobia 
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had greater access to negative meaning networks generally. This finding is consistent 
with erotophobic participants either having a general processing bias toward negative 
interpretations or having a negative affective response to their participation in a sex 
study. 
In summary, this work (Janssen et al., 2000; Macapagal & Janssen, 2011; 
Spiering et al., 2003, 2006; Spiering & Laan, 2004) has established that (a) it is possible 
to automatically activate sexual meanings, and (b) those automatically-activated sexual 
meanings need not coincide with the slower, cognitively-mediated sexual meanings 
derived from supraliminally presented stimuli.  Other work, notably that of Prause, 
Janssen and Hetrick (2008), has measured the extent to which variability in attending to 
sexual stimuli is related to sexual desire.  Using supraliminally-presented stimuli, Prause, 
Janssen and Hetrick (2008) found that participants with lower levels of sexual desire (as 
measured by the Sexual Desire Inventory, Spector et al., 1996) responded more quickly 
when a probe dot was in the area previously occupied by erotic stimuli, suggesting that 
the participants with lower levels of desire spent more time looking at the erotic images 
than participants with higher levels of desire.  The authors present a variety of hypotheses 
for this intuitively confusing finding.  They suggest three possibilities.  First, that the 
erotic stimulus may have been perceived as more novel by the participants with lower 
desire; second, that they may have had a stronger emotional reaction and thus had a 
harder time disengaging from the stimulus; or third, that, since people generally do not 
return to a visual region once searched, people with higher desire levels may have been 
drawn to the erotic image first and then did not return to it.  Although there are multiple 
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potential interpretations of these results, the central issue in the context of the present 
study is that a relationship was found between a self-report measure of sexual attitude and 
a cognitive measure of attention to sexual stimuli.  Similarly, other work (Giargiari et al., 
2005) has found related evidence supportive of a connection between non-consciously 
mediated responses to sexual stimuli and self-report measures of sexuality by using the 
acoustic startle response described above. 
Implications of discrepant Type 1 and Type 2 attentional biases 
Despite the strong evidence documenting Type 1 and Type 2 responses, little is 
known about how these response types coincide, as few studies in any affective domain 
have included measures of Type 1 and Type 2 responses within the same person.  The 
studies that have analyzed concurrent measures have yielded interesting results. For 
example, in recovered, substance-craving participants, a Type 1 positive attentional bias 
was generally observed to be paired with a Type 2 neutral bias (Stormark et al., 1997). 
However, this response discrepancy was not present in participants with active substance 
use, who generally exhibited approach in both their Type 1 and Type 2 responses. Thus, 
the congruency of approach vs. avoidance in Type 1 and Type 2 responses varies with 
past vs. active substance abuse, with the discrepancy of response type being unique to 
recovered, yet craving participants. Having different Type 1 and Type 2 responses to the 
same stimuli has been described as suggestive of conflicting motivational drives 
(Stormark et al., 1997), with one drive dominating the Type 1 response (an automatic 
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craving response) and another dominating the Type 2 response (conscious controlled, or 
avoidant, behavior).  
Researchers have only recently begun to study Type 1 and Type 2 responses to 
sexual stimuli (Brauer et al., 2011; Hoffmann, Janssen, & Turner, 2004; Janssen et al., 
2000; Prause, 2006; Prause et al., 2008; Roberts & Prause, 2012).  As with the majority 
of studies in other affective domains, the sexual response studies conducted to date have 
only assessed either Type 1 response or Type 2 response, but have not measured both 
response types within the same person. Thus, the variation of erotic response within an 
individual remains unknown. Evidence of a single person having different avoidant or 
approach biases across Type 1 and Type 2 responses to sexual stimuli may suggest, as 
with substance-specific stimuli, that the two different responses are capturing two distinct 
(and conflicting) aspects of a person’s reaction to erotic stimulation.  Additionally, it 
remains unknown whether dissonance between Type 1 and Type 2 responses to sexual 
stimuli is associated with distress. 
Distress.  Distress is a diagnostic component of the majority of the psychological 
disorders recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, 2013), including most (although not all) sexual disorders, such as 
Female Orgasmic Disorder or Male Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder.  Distress is of 
particular importance in the understanding of sexual function and dysfunction, given that 
two people’s identical sexual experiences and capacities could be diagnosed as a disorder 
or not, hinging solely on distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 425–450).  
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While distress is implicitly and broadly defined across many branches of research as a 
“negative emotional state” (Simons & Gaher, 2005, p. 83), other researchers bemoan the 
lack of specificity in that definition (First & Wakefield, 2010; Mulder, 2008; Phillips, 
2009; Stein et al., 2010).  Given that one path to diagnosis for a psychological sexual 
disorder is some combination of otherwise potentially normative sexual behavior plus 
distress, the reliable identification and understanding of distress is of central clinical 
importance.  The hypothesized relationship between conflicting attentional biases and 
distress is thus of both theoretical and clinical relevance. 
Sexual distress.  Sexual distress is a broad concept, and includes distress of a 
variety of etiologies and at varying degrees of specificity.  Some are as specific as stress 
due to erectile difficulty (Aversa et al., 2012; Helgason et al., 1996), while others are 
broader, such as the Female Sexual Distress Scale (FSDS, DeRogatis, Rosen, Leiblum, 
Burnett, & Heiman, 2002) which includes largely general questions such as “How often 
did you feel distressed about your sex life?”  The hypothesized relationship between 
discordant attentional biases toward erotic material and sexual distress is thus best tested 
by considering both a broad measure of sexual distress and one that considers the more 
specific aspect of sexuality that this conflict theory posits will be affected: desire. 
Desire discrepancy distress.  While the FSDS-R contains a single question about 
desire (DeRogatis, Clayton, Lewis-D’Agostino, Wunderlich, & Fu, 2008), that question 
posits a dissatisfaction with a low level of desire.  This study is centered on the 
conflicting internal measures of desire and does not presume that conflict only exists 
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between a conscious-Type 2 high desire and an automatic-Type 1 low desire.  Thus the 
study will consider both the level of desire the participant reports wanting and the level of 
desire the participant reports having – and the amount of distress related to that 
discrepancy.   
This study.  Due to the paucity of research jointly examining Type 1 and Type 2 
responses within the same person, it remains unknown whether sexual stimuli may elicit 
conflicting Type 1 and Type 2 attentional biases, and whether the incongruity of 
responses is associated with an underlying distress. Therefore, the present study sought to 
elucidate response variation to sexual stimuli and how these responses are associated with 
distress. Specifically, the current study is a novel application of the dot probe task to 
sexual arousal stimuli as a means to (1) identify differing Type 1 and Type 2 responses to 
erotic stimuli as a means to distinguish the automatic/deliberate responses to sexual 
stimuli within an individual, and (2) explore the implications of the conflicting drives 
implied by having different Type 1 and Type 2 responses to sexual stimuli. These 
findings further the understanding of the nature of sexual distress per se, including the 
mechanisms by which sexual distress is related to sexual function and satisfaction.  
Should conflicting attentional biases be shown to be related to sexual distress, further 
research could explore whether the resolution of that bias is related to the resolution of 
that distress. 
An additional novel aspect of this study is the use of Internet-based cognitive 
assessment techniques to capture responses to sexual stimuli.  Although prior work has 
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established that on-line tools are effective at gathering both survey data (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; D. Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013) and millisecond-
accurate cognitive tasks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Crump et al., 2013; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), no study to date has used these methods to 
evaluate response to erotic stimuli. 
Covariates and secondary analyses 
Several additional variables were captured for use as covariates or in secondary 
analyses.  These include factors that are known to be associated with one or more of the 
variables of primary interest, or variables that are potentially connected with the 
processes implicit in the hypothesized relationship between distress and conflicting 
attentional biases. 
Covariates.  Gender was captured and included in analyses, both because 
confirmation of gender identity was required to confirm that the participant met inclusion 
criteria, and because research suggests that women experience more distress generally 
than men do (Mirowsky & Ross, 1995), and may experience it in different ways 
including, for example, different severity and types of psychopathology (Caspi et al., 
2014; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001).  Similarly, since a central aspect of the proposed models 
is the experience of sexual desire, any gender differences in sexual desire would be 
relevant.  There is mixed evidence of differences in sexual desire between men and 
women once social expectations are accounted for (Alexander & Fisher, 2003; Leiblum, 
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2002). Because of that, gender was captured and included in virtually every analysis 
unless the data demonstrated that gender differences were not meaningful. 
Sexual satisfaction, while not a primary variable of interest in this study, was 
captured because of the theoretical (and empirically demonstrated) relationship between 
sexual desire and sexual satisfaction, with higher levels of sexual functioning being 
generally associated with higher levels of sexual desire (see Hurlbert, Apt, & Rabehl, 
1993; Santtila et al., 2007; Sprecher, 2002, amongst many others).  By including sexual 
satisfaction, some of that shared variability was accounted for to better highlight the 
predicted main effects. 
Given both the strong relationship between depression and anxiety and gender 
(McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001; Silverstein, 2002), 
and given the previously mentioned connection between the psychopathological 
expression of distress and gender (Caspi et al., 2014) given a specified level of distress, 
the inclusion of measures of depressive and anxious symptoms allows for greater analytic 
clarity.  Of note is that no attempt was made to exclude participants with high scores on 
measures of depressive or anxious symptoms, since variability in distress is a key 
variable of interest. 
Secondary analyses.  The primary hypotheses seek to explore the relationship 
between attention toward erotic stimuli and distress.  However, some clear candidates for 
the source of the cognitive schemas described as the mediators of that effect can be 
theorized, even prior to a complete understanding of the end points of that relationship.  
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Religiousness in general has long been explored as a factor associated with sexual 
attitude and behavior (Ahrold, Farmer, Trapnell, & Meston, 2011; Hale & Clark, 2013; 
Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948a, 1948b).  Religious fundamentalism, or the belief that 
one particular set of religious beliefs is absolutely true (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) 
has been explored as a relatively straightforward way to assess the religiousness of an 
individual without having to explore the idiosyncratic beliefs of each particular type of 
religion (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).  Given that the central hypotheses are intended 
to demonstrate the existence of this relationship, a full exploration of possible mediating 
factors would be premature.  However, the inclusion of a measure of fundamentalism for 
exploratory purposes allows both an enhanced analysis of one possible mechanism of 
action and further information about the nature of the sample. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with prior research using the dot probe technique in a 
variety of affective domains, this study first tested Prause’s model of the relationship 
between desire and attentional bias toward erotic stimuli. This is an application of the 
technique used by Noël et al. (2006) in the exploration of fast and slow responses to 
alcohol stimuli, and by Mogg and Bradley in their (2006) work with phobic stimuli. To 
support this hypothesis, findings from simultaneously collected measurements of 
attentional bias in different time frames should replicate previous findings reviewed 
above.  Consistent with Prause’s (2006) findings, I hypothesize that higher sexual desire 
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scores will be associated with an attentional bias away from erotic stimuli at the 500 ms 
presentation time.  See Figure 2. 
 Hypothesis 2.  I further hypothesize that, consistent with the alcohol and phobia 
literature (Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Noël et al., 2006), those respondents who have 
different attentional biases toward erotic material depending on the stimulus presentation 
time will report greater distress related directly to their desire discrepancy or to sexuality 
in general.  This will be reflected directly in their self-report of sexual distress and/or 
desire discrepancy distress.  Thus I hypothesize that the difference in attentional bias 
between fast and slow presentation in the same person will be predictive of sexual 




Recruitment and compensation.  Participants were recruited via two separate 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs).  The first recruited for 
women between the ages of 25 and 35, and the second recruited for men between 25 and 
35.  Each allowed for 200 participants, for a total target sample size (before excluding 
those participants not eligible to complete the dot probe task) of 400.  Consistent with the 
data quality management recommendations from Buhrmeister, Kwang and Gosling 
(2011), participants were not recruited if they had fewer than 90% of their previous HITs 
successfully completed, or fewer than 100 successful HITs completed.  Upon completion 
of the survey, participants were paid $3.00, with another $2.00 available if they qualified 
for and completed the dot probe task. Of the 400 participants who started the MTurk HIT, 
396 provided enough data on the survey to be evaluated for inclusion in all parts of the 
study.  The four thus excluded did not answer any questions on the survey. As explained 
below, 174 participants completed the dot probe task. 
Overview of inclusion and exclusion criteria.  To be eligible for the study, 
participants must have been (a) be between the ages of 25 and 35; (b) report no 
significant head injury with loss of consciousness; (c) report no hand or arm movement 
limitations or disorders that would potentially affect speed of response; (d) report no 
deficits in visual acuity that cannot be corrected sufficiently to, for example, be able to 
drive a car; (e) be fluent in written English; (f) have at least one-time access to a 
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computer with a processor and monitor capable of providing millisecond-level timing, as 
assessed by Inquisit 4 Web experiment presentation software (Draine, 2013)ii and be 
willing and able to install the Inquisit plugin; (g) be willing to view sexually explicit 
images and answer questions about their sexual experiences and ‘qualified’ via 
Mechanical Turk to participate in adult-content HITs; (h) report being at least 
predominately heterosexual when answering the Kinsey sexual orientation scale (Kinsey 
et al., 1948a, 1948b); (i) have engaged in sexual activity in the last four weeks; and (j) not 
have any sexual dysfunction other than Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder.  In addition, 
by creating one HIT each for men and women – and by clarifying that this requirement 
refers to cisiii gendered persons – transgendered people are excluded from participating.  
See for a breakdown of the number of participants excluded by each criterion. 
Criterion A: Participants must be between 25 and 35.  Evidence suggests that 
sexual function and dysfunction are strongly related to age, for both women (Laumann, 
Paik, & Rosen, 1999) and men (Lewis et al., 2010).  By logical necessity, the number and 
variety of sexual experiences must also, when considering a population as a whole, 
increase with age.  Thus, the younger a sample is, the more homogeneity of sexual 
function and experience one is likely to find.  On the higher end of age, menopause has 
long been associated with changes in sexual function and satisfaction in women (Avis, 
Stellato, Crawford, Johannes, & Longcope, 2000; Davison, Bell, LaChina, Holden, & 
Davis, 2008), and age, particularly in men past middle age, has similarly been associated 
with changes in sexual function and satisfaction (Corona et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2010).  
Thus, in order to keep consistent age ranges for both male and female participants, the 
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criterion must include people old enough to demonstrate sufficient variability in sexual 
experience, satisfaction and function, while excluding those participants whose age has 
begun to change their sexual function for reasons that may be unrelated to their 
psychological function.  Note that both younger and older groups may be of interest to 
future studies; it is the mixing of these three groups (younger, older, and the targeted age 
rance) that presents challenges for interpretation.  Thus, consistent with prior work in the 
field (Rellini, 2007), participants under the age of 25 are excluded to ensure sufficient 
variety in sexual experiences and function, and participants over the age of 35 were 
excluded to ensure no age or menopause-related changes in sexual function and 
satisfaction. Applying this criterion excluded 11.62% of participants. 
Criteria B – E: Physical and language limitations. Participants must be 
physically capable of completing the tasks required of them in the study, and must read 
English with enough fluency to read, understand and follow directions.  Since 
participants are being recruited on-line, physical limitations that may be evident to a 
researcher in person are not detectable prior to the start of the study.  Making these 
exclusion criteria explicit and including them at the beginning of the study was intended 
to reduce the number of participants who begin the study but are unable to complete it.  
Since these criteria were specified prior to be the start of the study, there is no 
information about the number of potential respondents who did not meet these criteria. 
Criterion F: Hardware and software compatibility. The Inquisit Web (the 
software to be used in this study) platform is very broadly compatible across computer 
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systems and software, with versions of their plugin available for all major Windows, 
Macintosh and Linux browsers, including Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Opera and 
Safari (Draine, 2013).  These combinations of browsers and operating systems account 
for 99.57% of all Internet users (NetMarketShare, 2013), meaning that (assuming the 
users of MTurk do not have different browser usage patterns than the rest of the browser 
market, an assumption for which there is no competing evidence) 0.43% of potential 
participants will be using software that Inquisit does not support.  Inquisit Web is capable 
of identifying hardware limitations that may exclude participants (such as an unusually 
low-resolution display) and preventing them from beginning the tasks; however, since the 
minimum requirement is an 800x600 display and recent evidence (w3schools.com, 2013) 
notes that 99.5% of web visitors are using displays with resolution of 800x600 or higher, 
even if there is no overlap between the ‘unusual browser’ group and the ‘low resolution’ 
group, only approximately 1% of potential participants would be excluded on the basis of 
technological limitations.  Participants were instructed that they would be unable to 
complete the tasks as required using a phone, tablet, or other device with only a touch-
screen interface, and the software did not allow users of such devices to begin the study.  
For that reason, there is no information about the number of potential respondents who 
did not meet this criterion. 
Inquisit does require that a browser plugin be installed to complete the study.  
This requirement means that the user must have the (a) the technical skills required to 
install software on the computer they are using, (b) the software authority required to 
install software, and (c) the willingness to install a plugin.  While each of these 
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conditions will likely exclude some participants, there is no reason to believe that this 
exclusion will skew results as, for example, there is no evidence or theory that suggests 
that people who are higher on erotophilia are less likely to have administrative rights on 
their laptops.  Similarly, while ‘installing a plugin’ sounds as if it would require technical 
skills, statistics from Adobe suggest that, as of 2009, 98.9% of web users had installed 
the Adobe Flash plugin (Adobe, Inc., 2009), a procedure identical to the one required to 
install the Inquisit plugin.  Running the experiment without a plugin would be preferable 
by far; the technology to do so does not yet seem to be commercially available, and 
manually programming the experiment in Adobe Flash is untenable (and would still 
require a plugin; Reimers & Stewart, 2007).  There is no information about the number of 
participants who did not meet this criterion since they would have been unable to even 
begin the study. 
Criterion G: Willingness to view sexually explicit materials.  Previous studies 
have consistently and repeatedly demonstrated (Bogaert, 1996; Dunne et al., 1997; 
Fenton, Johnson, McManus, & Erens, 2001; Morokoff, 1986; Plaud, Gaither, Hegstad, 
Rowan, & Devitt, 1999; Wiederman, 1999; Wolchik, Braver, & Jensen, 1985; Wolchik, 
Spencer, & Lisi, 1983) that there are measurable differences between people willing to 
participate in sexuality research and people not willing to participate.  Suggestions have 
been made to minimize the difference between responders and non-responders (e.g., 
Wolchik et al., 1985; minimize the literal and psychological instrusiveness of the 
measures) and others have noted the effect size of the difference between willing 
participants and those unwilling to participate is relatively small (e.g., Dunne et al., 1997) 
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and thus not important enough to disrupt research.  Others note that the difference could 
be very important, since volunteers for studies with sexual content tend to be more 
sexually experienced and, problematically for the current study, have greater ‘sexual self-
esteem’ (Wiederman, 1999). 
Wolchik et al.’s suggestions (1985) have already been applied to this study: the 
measurements are the least intrusive necessary to gather the information required.  Thus, 
given the (reasonable, ethical) requirement that participants be informed that they are 
taking part in a study with sexually explicit content, the potential for skewed results is 
unavoidable.  This is a limitation of this and similar studies, and not one for which a 
solution has yet been found. 
Although participants are already required to be 25 years of age, Mechanical Turk 
requires that tasks with adult content be clearly marked as such and that participants who 
wish to take part in such tasks have previously indicated that they are comfortable doing 
so and are at least 18 years old.  This additional level of qualification may have enhanced 
the difference between participants willing to participate in sex research and those not, 
since presumably the majority of sexual-content tasks are not academic surveys.  
However, this topic has not been researched, and this is a structural requirement of using 
Mechanical Turk as a recruitment tool.  This is, however, an important limitation of the 
study.  Given current technical limitations, there is no way of determining either how 
many participants would have seen the MTurk posting and responded if the content had 
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not been sexually explicit or how those participants might have differed from the 
participants who did respond. 
Criteria H – J: Sexual activity in the last four months, heterosexuality and 
sexual function.  Both the Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI) and the International 
Index of Erectile Function (IIEF) are structured such that respondents must have had 
heterosexual, partnered sexual activity in the last four weeks in order to meaningfully 
complete the measure (Rosen et al., 1997, 2000).  While other measurements could be 
used in place of the FSFI and the IIEF, the assessment of sexual function necessarily 
requires that there be a reasonable ‘trial’ of that function.   
Similarly, the exclusion of participants who are not at least predominately 
heterosexual inherently limits the generalizability of the study.  However, since men are 
visually ‘category specific’ in that they direct visual attention to images showing 
attractive people of the gender to which they report being attracted (Lippa, 2012; Lippa, 
Patterson, & Marelich, 2010), the inclusion of men who are not predominately 
heterosexual would complicate analysis.  Further, since both the FSFI and the IIEF 
require heterosexual, penetrative activity to assess pain and erectile function (Rosen et 
al., 1997, 2000), respectively, potential participants who are not predominately 
heterosexual are less likely to have the required sexual experiences.  This is a limitation 
of the study. 
Participants whose scores on the FSFI or IIEF are indicative of sexual dysfunction 
other than Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder were excluded from participation in the 
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study.  Sexual distress is a primary outcome measure, and the inclusion of participants 
with chronic disorders that themselves produce sexual distress potentially unrelated to the 
attentional biases being measured would introduce noise without adding explanatory 
power.  Participants with HSDD were not excluded, since the present study is interested 
in exploring, amongst other things, the effects of desire on attentional bias discrepancies, 
and thus the exclusion of participants with low sexual desire would unnecessarily 
constrict an important factor in the analysis. 
Of the 350 respondents who met criteria A through G, 22 (6.29%) indicated that 
they were not either exclusively or predominately heterosexual and were excluded from 
the cognitive task.  Of the 328 respondents who remained, 53 (16.16%) indicated that 
they had not had penetrative sex in the past four weeks and were excluded.  There were 
no significant differences in the proportions of men and women excluded based on any of 
the criteria from A through I. 
Criterion J requires that the participant’s sexual function be above clinical cut-offs 
for the FSFI and IIEF, excluding the Desire subscales for each measure.  Since the 
clinical cut-offs for each measure were determined for the full-scale and not the subscales 
(Rosen et al., 1997; Wiegel, Meston, & Rosen, 2005), subscale cut-offs were calculated 
by using published distributions of each subscale (Rosen et al., 2000; Wiegel et al., 2005) 
and the IIEF (Rosen et al., 1997; Rosen, Cappelleri, & Gendrano, 2002) and establishing 
a cut-off two standard deviations below (higher scores on the FSFI and IIEF are 
associated with better sexual function) general population norms.  For the FSFI, that 
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meant subscale cut-offs of 3.16 for the Arousal scale, 3.97 for Lubrication, 3.75 for 
Orgasm and 4.22 for Pain.  For the IIEF, the cut-offs were 6 for the Orgasm scale, 9 for 
Intercourse and 19 for Erectile. 
There was a significant difference between the proportion of men and women 
excluded by criterion J.  More women (N = 47, 32.64% of those qualified based on 
criteria A through I) than men (N = 27, 20.61% of those qualified based on prior criteria) 
were excluded based on this criterion 
After applying all inclusion and exclusion criteria, 97 women and 104 men 
qualified and were offered a chance to complete the dot probe task in exchange for an 
additional $2.00 in compensation.  Of those offered, more women (N = 94, 96.91% of 
those qualified) than men (N = 79, 75.96% of those qualified) agreed to complete the 
cognitive task.  See Table 1 for detail. 
There were significant differences between participants who did and did not 
complete the task.  See Table 2 and Table 3 for a comprehensive review and details.  
Broadly, participants who completed the task were less likely to report discrepant sexual 
desire, less likely to be distressed about that discrepancy, more sexually satisfied (as 
measured by the SSS), less sexually distressed (as measured by the FSDS), more 
erotophillic (as measured by the SOS) and reported lower levels of anxiety, depression 
and somatic symptoms (as measured by the BSI).  They were also more likely to be in a 
relationship, but did not differ on age, number of children, income, education, 
fundamentalism or their rating of how erotic they found each image.  This difference on 
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measures of interest is a significant limitation of the study, although, given the 
relationship between qualifying factors (e.g., sexual function, recent sexual experiences), 
such differences are both unsurprising and unavoidable.       
Measures 
Study-specific questionnaires.  Participants completed one study-specific 
questionnaire first, which included both general demographic questions and questions 
about distress related specifically to desire. 
Demographic questionnaire.  Participants were asked for demographic 
information, which confirmed that participants met criteria for participation and gather 
age, gender, sexual orientation (Kinsey et al., 1948a, 1948b).  Participants who provided 
answers that are not consistent with participation criteria, or who indicate that they started 
the wrong HIT (i.e., a participant selects the HIT for men and indicates that she is a 
woman) were excluded from the survey.  For convenience, the demographics 
questionnaire also contained the two desire distress items, described below. 
Assessment of sexual function and satisfaction and erotophilia.  Participants 
were given one of the two following surveys, depending on their stated gender (and 
consistent with the particular HIT to which they responded).  Thus, no single participant 
received both the sexual function scale for women and that for men.  Of note is that the 
two scales were developed to be roughly comparable (Rosen et al., 1997, 2000), but that 
the scales do not align precisely.  For example, the IIEF does not have a pain scale, and 
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distinguishes intercourse satisfaction from general satisfaction.  For that reason, for 
analyses that required the use of a single measure of sexual function, IIEF and FSFI 
scores were separately z-scored and merged into a single measure. 
The Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI).  The FSFI (Rosen et al., 2000) 
measures female respondents’ sexual function with six subscales: desire, arousal, 
lubrication, orgasm, satisfaction and pain, as well as a full-scale with a cut-off for 
clinically significant sexual dysfunction (Wiegel et al., 2005).  Each subscale has a 
maximum score of 6, and minimum scores from 0 to 1.2.  The full-scale has a maximum 
score of 36; scores below 26 are consistent with sexual dysfunction (Wiegel et al., 2005).  
The instrument itself consists of 19 multiple choice questions, and has high test-retest 
reliability (r = .79 - .86) and high internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha greater 
than .82 (Rosen et al., 2000). 
The International Index of Erectile Function (IIEF).  The IIEF (Rosen et al., 
1997, 2002) is a 15-item self-report measure of sexual functioning in men, consisting of a 
full scale and five subscales: desire, erectile ability, orgasmic function, intercourse 
satisfaction, and overall satisfaction. Subscale scores have maximums that vary from 30 
(erectile function), to 15 (intercourse satisfaction), to 10 (orgasmic function, sexual desire 
and overall satisfaction), with minimums varying from 0 to 2.  The full scale has a 
maximum of 75 and a minimum of 5.  The scale has been found to have high internal 
consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .91 (Rosen et al., 1997).  The scale has 
seen extensive use internationally (Rosen et al., 2002), and has been validated in a wide 
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variety of populations (E.g., Kriston, Günzler, Harms, & Berner, 2008; Lim et al., 2003; 
Wiltink, Hauck, Phädayanon, Weidner, & Beutel, 2003). 
The Sexual Satisfaction Scale for Women and Men (SSS-W/M).  The SSS-W/M 
(Meston & Trapnell, 2005; Pukall, 2008) is a 30-item measure of sexual satisfaction with 
a full scale and five subscales: communication, compatibility, contentment, personal 
concerns and relational concerns.  The women’s version of this scale has shown adequate 
internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .74, and adequate test-retest 
reliability, with r between .58 and .79.  The version for use with men and women has not 
been validated; however, it is a direct translation of the women’s version, which has been 
well-used and cited (For example, Gerrior, Watt, Weaver, & Gallagher, 2015; Pechorro et 
al., 2015; Stephenson & Meston, 2015a, 2015b and ; Witherow, Chandraiah, Seals, & 
Bugan, 2015 all cite Meston & Trapnell, 2006 and were published in the first four months 
of 2015).  
Sexual Opinion Survey (SOS).  The SOS (Fisher et al., 1988; Gilbert & 
Gamache, 1984; White, Fisher, Byrne, & Kingma, 1977) is a 21-item, single-scale 
measure of erotophilia and erotophobia with a maximum score of 7 and a minimum score 
of 1 (items scores were averaged).  Cronbach’s alpha is good, with results between .88 
and .90.  Individual questions are scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).  
The definition and measurement of sexual distress.  Sexual distress, 
particularly in women, has seen a recent surge of research (Bancroft, Loftus, & Long, 
2003; Bancroft et al., 2003; DeRogatis et al., 2008, 2008) in response, some researchers 
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theorize, to the development of medications that cause – and the possibility of 
medications that treat – sexual dysfunction in women (Bancroft et al., 2003).  For 
women, the Female Sexual Distress Scale (FSDS, and FSDS-R) have proved to be well-
validated and popular measurement instruments (DeRogatis et al., 2008, 2002).  This 
measure, including psychometric validation, is described below. 
In men, however, sexual distress is not well examined.  Sexual distress in men is 
more often referred to as sexual bother (Evangelia et al., 2010; Kuwata et al., 2007; 
Nelson, Deveci, Stasi, Scardino, & Mulhall, 2010; J. F. Smith, Breyer, & Shindel, 2011), 
and is generally measured through instruments that assess erectile function (Aversa et al., 
2012; Cooperberg et al., 2003; Lubeck, Litwin, Henning, & Carroll, 1997), one to three 
item idiosyncratic question sets (Nelson et al., 2010; J. F. Smith et al., 2011), or, far less 
frequently, a single purpose-built questionnaire (Ugolini et al., 2008), which has been 
cited once (Aversa et al., 2012) since its validation.  Conflating erectile function and 
sexual distress seems problematic, since although erectile dysfunction is distressing (for 
example, Helgason et al., 1996 notes that the most distressing aspect of prostate cancer 
was waning erectile function), other aspects of the sexual experience have been 
demonstrated to be distressing to men, including low desire and premature ejaculation 
(Laumann et al., 1999), or conflict about to whom one is attracted or not attracted.  In 
short, with men as with women, every aspect of sexual experience could be the source of 
distress, not just erectile function.  One way to measure sexual distress in men, then, 
would be to use a portion of an existing scale as in Nelson, et al., (2010), which used the 
three-item Sexual Bother subscale from the Prostate-Health Related Quality-of-Life 
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Questionnaire (Befort et al., 2005), which asks how big of a problem erectile function is, 
whether the problem is embarrassing or shameful, and whether it made it difficult to 
enjoy life.  While this approach has simplicity on its side, it introduces a theoretical and 
statistical imbalance between genders, since the FSDS-R, which is clearly the best choice 
to evaluate sexual distress in women, has 13 items, which cover a variety of aspects of 
distress, and has strong psychometric support. 
Instead, the present study presented the FSDS-R to men without modification.  In 
reviewing the 13 items of the FSDS-R, only one item even suggests a potential gender 
imbalance – item 13, “How often do you feel bothered by low sexual desire?” (DeRogatis 
et al., 2008).  That item, which will, on its face, be easily understood by men, is only 
problematic in as much as low sexual desire is commonly thought of as more of a 
problem in women than with men (Segraves & Segraves, 1991).  Thus, although the 
measure has not been validated in men, for this study, sexual distress in men will be 
assessed with the FSDS-R. 
As discussed above, the FSDS-R measures general sexual distress; there are no 
validated instruments for assessing distress associated with a discrepancy between the 
level of sexual desire a person wants and the level they have.  For that reason, two 
purpose-written items are included to assess desire discrepancy distress.   
The Female Sexual Distress Scale – Revised (FSDS-R).  The FSDS-R 
(DeRogatis et al., 2008) consists of 13 Likert-scale items.  It differs from the original 
FSDS (DeRogatis et al., 2002) only in that it includes an additional item, “Bothered by 
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low sexual desire.”  The single full scale consists of the sum of all the items, and thus can 
vary from 0 (no distress at all) to 52 (as much distress as possible).  The validation article 
notes that the FSDS-R has a cut-off score of 11 or greater to indicate sexual dysfunction 
in women.  The FSDS-R has good psychometric properties, with four-week test-retest 
coefficient of .88, and Cronbach’s alpha of between .92 and .96. 
Desire discrepancy distress items.  Two items specific to distress related to desire 
were included at the end of the demographic questionnaire.  There are no validated 
measures that specifically assess the sought level of sexual desire and the actual level of 
sexual desire, and the distress related to that conflict, and thus these study-specific items 
are included to gather this information directly.  The first question asks directly about the 
difference between the level of sexual desire the participant wants and the level of desire 
the participant has, providing a five-point Likert scale centered on “My level of sexual 
desire is about where I want it to be,” and varying from “My level of sexual desire is 
much lower than I want it to be” to “My level of sexual desire is much higher than I want 
it to be.”  The second item asks on a four-point scale the amount of distress associated 
with that difference, from “It doesn’t bother me at all” to “It bothers me very much.”  
Note that if there is no reported discrepancy, the second question will not be asked.   
Brief Symptom Inventory-18 (BSI-18).  The BSI-18 (DeRogatis, 2001; Zabora et 
al., 2001) consists of 18 five-point Likert-scale items drawn from the substantially longer 
Brief Symptom Inventory (DeRogatis & Melisaratos, 1983).  The full scale, or Global 
Severity Index (GSI) measures overall psychological distress.  There are three additional 
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subscales, consisting of Somatization, Depression and Anxiety.  Cronbach’s alpha for the 
BSI-18 is good at .89.  The BSI-18 is strongly correlated with the original BSI, r = .84.   
Image ratings.  Participants, whether they qualified for and completed the dot 
probe task or not, rated how erotic they found each erotic image used in the dot probe 
from zero to four, with zero being entirely non-erotic and four being very erotic. 
Cognitive measurement of attentional bias with a Dot Probe task.  Participants were 
then given instructions for the completion of the on-line attentional bias measure.  
Consistent with recommendations about instructional manipulation checks and MTurk, 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) after viewing the instructions on-line, 
participants were given a brief quiz about those instructions.  Participants who did not 
answer correctly will be sent back to the instructions page.  Participants who answer all 
questions correctly will move on to the ten practice items, followed by the trials, 
consistent with Noel et al. procedure (2006).  Although the system was designed to reject 
any participant who did not pass the instruction quiz twice in a row, no participant was 
thus excluded. 
For this study, the dot probe task was conducted as per a slightly modified form of 
the methodology used to detect differences in attentional bias in alcoholics (Noël et al., 
2006).  In that study, 64 participants were presented with relevant (in the original study, 
alcohol; in this study, erotic) images paired with neutral images (plants).  The images 
were presented for 50 ms, 500 ms, and 1,250 ms.  The difference in direction of 
attentional bias was observed between 50 and 500 ms for the alcoholics, with the 500 and 
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1,250 ms responses for alcoholics being approximately equal.  Each participant was given 
10 practice trials, than a counterbalanced series of 180 trials including 120 trials during 
which each of the 40 pictures was presented at each of the three speeds of presentation, 
and 60 trials involving filler pictures.  After collecting the data, reaction times of more 
than 2,000 ms were eliminated, as were reaction times that were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations above the mean.  Attentional bias scores for each participant were calculated 
by subtracting the mean reaction time for alcohol pictures from the mean reaction time 
for neutral pictures within each presentation time, with trials in which the probe replaced 
the alcohol picture being identified as ‘congruent’ and trials in which the probe replaced 
the neutral picture being identified as ‘incongruent.’  The present study used this 
procedure with very minor modifications to generate attentional bias scores for erotic and 
neutral images at three different speeds for each participant.   
For each trial, practice or actual, the procedure was the same, although the 
practice trials used all neutral pictures and the actual trials will use half neutral and half 
erotic images.  The erotic images were half mildly erotic (kissing, touching, no visible 
genital contact) and half explicitly erotic (partnered sexual activity with genitals visible).  
Mildly erotic images were drawn from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and more explicitly erotic images were drawn from 
other, similar work that has explored reactions to erotic images (Both, Spiering, Everaerd, 
& Laan, 2004; Prause, 2006; Prause et al., 2008; Spiering et al., 2003).  The IAPS set 
provided both the mildly erotic images, which include naked men, women, and partnered 
mild sexual activity (e.g., kissing and touching), and neutral images, such as those of 
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landscapes and plants.  The mildly erotic images selected all had positive “pleasant” 
ratings from both men and women and included both a clear male and female figure.  
Neutral images selected all had positive “pleasant” ratings from both men and women; 
given that criteria, the images with the highest (non-sexual) arousal ratings were selected 
to match the (non-sexual) arousal ratings associated with the erotic images.  During the 
dot probe task,  fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed by a pair of pictures 
that are presented for either 50, 500 or 1,250 ms.  A probe dot then appeared behind one 
of the two images, and the participant’s response time for correctly determining whether 
the dot appeared on the right or the left of the screen was recorded.  Ten practice trials 
were conducted with pictures which will not again be used in the study, followed by a 
feedback screen.  Next, 120 actual trials with erotic images paired with neutral images 
were presented as forty sets at three different presentation speeds.  Filler trials, consisting 
of neutral images paired with other neutral images, were added to the sequence to bring 
the number of total trials to 190 trials: 10 practice, 120 actual and 60 filler. 
Consistent with suggestions for conducting research on MTurk (Buhrmester et al., 
2011; Crump et al., 2013; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010; D. 
Shapiro et al., 2013), some minor modifications were made to the process to increase 
participant focus and engagement.  Feedback was provided every 20 trials, giving 
participants a summary of their progress so far and reminding participants with unusually 
slow reaction times (average of greater than 750 ms for the past 20 trials) to respond 
quickly, and participants with inaccuracy rates of more than four incorrect out of the past 
20 trials of the instructions to stay focused.  Thus, over the course of 180 non-practice 
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trials, participants saw a feedback screen nine times, in addition to the post-practice 
feedback screen. 
The dot probe task has been shown to produce results similar in direction and 
magnitude to the Emotional Stroop task (Peckham et al., 2010). There have been recent 
concerns about the reliability of the dot probe task, with one researcher finding low levels 
of test-retest reliability (Schmukle, 2005).  The findings, while interesting, have yet to be 
replicated, and the author does not address the decades of work that has reliably shown, 
for example, an attentional bias toward fear stimuli under a variety of circumstances (see, 
for example, Nader Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; N Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 
2010; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Colin, Lih, Elizabeth, & Lynlee, 2007; Derryberry 
& Reed, 2002; Mogg et al., 1995, 1992; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  Thus, although 
Schmukle’s 2005 findings are important to consider, the preponderance of the existing 
evidence supports the use of a dot probe task as a measure of attentional bias. 
Procedure 
Approval from the University of Vermont Institutional Review Board was 
requested and received prior to the start of data collection.  As the MTurk market is 
rapidly moving, the average hourly rate for participants increased between the original 
proposal and data collection.  For that reason, an amendment was submitted and 
approved that increased the compensation to the rates described here: $3.00 for 
completion of the surveys and an additional $2.00 for completion of the dot probe.  
Participants were recruited via two HITs posted on MTurk, as described above, and were 
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given consent documents on-line.  After providing an electronic signature indicating their 
consent to participate, participants were given the demographics questionnaire. 
Participants then completed the FSFI or IIEF, depending on their stated gender, followed 
by the SSS-W/M, the FSDS-R, the SOS, and the BSI-18.  Participants who met criteria to 
continue (described above; see Table 1 for details) were be offered a chance to continue 
to the dot probe task.  Participants who did not wish continue were then passed back to 
Mechanical Turk and paid $3.00.  Participants who completed the dot probe task, 
described above, were passed back to Mechanical Turk and paid an additional $2.00.  
Through use of a randomly generated two word code in one of two distinct patterns (to 
determine the amount to be paid), no link between the participant identity (required via 
MTurk for compensation) and the study results (stored separately in the Inquisit system) 
was possible, ensuring anonymity. 
Measurement of depression and anxiety.  Given the absence of research 
demonstrating that psychopathology has an influence on attention to sexual images in 
particular, and given that neither dot probe research, whether in sexuality (Prause, 2006; 
Prause et al., 2008) or in other affective domains (e.g., Colin et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 
1986, in which mood disorders are assessed since the primary research question was the 
relationship between mood disorders and attention) has excluded participants with mental 
health diagnoses, participants will not be excluded because of current mental health 
diagnoses.  Because of that, no attempt was made to assess participants for any particular 
diagnosis.  However, that same body of evidence suggests that depression and anxiety in 
particular have a measurable effect on attention to stimuli which are associated with 
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anxiety or depression (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mogg 
et al., 1995; Peckham et al., 2010).  Thus, although there is no theory that currently 
suggests a differential effect on Type 1 or Type 2 responses to sexual stimuli, the use of a 
state measure of anxiety and depression as a covariate allows for the influence of those 
systemic factors to be considered.  
Issues with the use of Mechanical Turk.  The MTurk framework is an on-line 
marketplace to connect people interested in completing relatively small tasks for 
relatively small payment (roughly between $0.01 and $5.00 per task, varying broadly by 
task length and unpleasantness).  The use of MTurk in the collection of data from 
participants is relatively new, but ample evidence suggests that participants and the data 
they provide are equivalent to in-person participants.  
Research has shown that these participants are generally slightly more diverse 
than a standard internet sample, and significantly more diverse than a university sample 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010; D. Shapiro et al., 2013), and that the rapid 
pace of data collection possible with MTurk does not affect data quality, given 
compensation ranges within the (relatively low, compared to participants who are 
required to come to a laboratory to conduct an experiment) MTurk standard (Buhrmester 
et al., 2011; Crump et al., 2013).  Research has further demonstrated that MTurk 
participants vary little in terms of their responses to ‘classic’ psychological measures, 
such as measures of time-value discounting and Big-Five personality traits, although 
MTurk participants were generally slightly less extraverted and had slightly lower self-
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esteem (Goodman et al., 2012), factors unlikely to have an influence on the current 
research question. 
Further, experiments requiring close attention and millisecond timing have been 
conducted using MTurk and the results found to match expectations and prior research, 
with relatively minor modifications discussed below.  The results of ‘classic’ 
experiments, such as the visual cueing task (Klein, 2000; Posner & Cohen, 1984), an 
attentional blink task (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; K. Shapiro, Raymond, & 
Arnell, 1997), and a masked priming task (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2002) were 
each replicated (Crump et al., 2013), after the addition of a few simple modifications.   
These studies recommend two additions to an MTurk task.  First, Goodman, 
Cryder and Cheema (2012) recommend the inclusion of an ‘Instructional Manipulation 
Check’ (as per Oppenheimer et al., 2009), or a question that is visually similar to other 
questions presented, but requires a slightly different answer.  For example, the original 
IMC was the instruction to write, “I read the instructions” somewhere on a paper and 
pencil survey form.  On-line, the Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko IMC was a 
paragraph of text that instructs participants not to answer the question below the 
paragraph, but instead click on the title of the page to continue.  This question was 
transformed somewhat for an MTurk study (Goodman et al., 2012), which instead 
quizzed participants on the content of the instructions themselves.  Goodman et al. (2012) 
reported an increase in power when using the quiz approach that was similar to the 
Oppenheimer et al. approach (2009).  The ‘quiz’ approach was applied here, with a brief 
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quiz about task instructions given to participants after they agreed to complete the dot 
probe task.  Participants who missed one or more questions were given the instructions 
and quizzed again.  If any participants had failed the quiz twice in a row, they would have 
been excluded from the study.  None did.   
Next, Crump et al. (2013) recommend that feedback be provided as continuously 
as possible to participants to maintain engagement.  For example, they recommend 
providing prompts to encourage speedy responses (when reaction time is relevant) or 
providing summaries of results when changing tasks.  For this study, personalized 
feedback screens were presented every 20 tasks, with data about accuracy rates and 
response times, and guidance, based on that data, to either pay more attention or focus on 
speed. 
Given the evidence that data collected via MTurk replicated that collected via 
traditional methods with the addition of relatively minor devices to assess attention, and 
given the evidence of the speed and ease with which a diverse sample can be collected, 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk becomes not only a viable option, but potentially an option 
superior to other traditional methods.  Consistent with the MTurk community standards 
and the amount of time required, participants were compensated $3.00 for completion of 
the surveys, with an additional $2.00 offered for the completion of the dot probe task.  
Almost all participants who responded to the Mechanical Turk (Amazon.com, 
Incorporated, 2005; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Crump et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2012) 
posting completed all surveys and image ratings (four answered no questions on the 
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survey and were excluded), although only participants who met inclusion criteria were 
offered a chance to continue to the dot probe task.  A total of 396 participants responded 
to the posting (189 men and 207 women). After applying inclusion and exclusion criteria 
(discussed below), 104 men and 97 women were offered a chance to complete the dot 
probe, and 79 men and 94 women completed the task.   
Data analytic strategy 
Sample size considerations.  All of the research to date that has explored 
differences in attentional bias across time has used pre-identified, categorical group 
differences (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2006, who compared alcoholics and social drinkers; 
and Noël et al., 2006, who compared people afraid of spiders with those not afraid), 
which has allowed for the use of repeated measures ANOVAs to analyze group 
differences.  In this study, the reaction time difference scores between presentation times 
are being used to predict a continuous variable, allowing for a multiple regression to be 
used to evaluate Hypothesis 2.  For the purposes of power analysis, an effect size for the 
effect of presentation duration on reaction time was calculated using published data from 
the two most similar studies (Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Noël et al., 2006), yielding values 
of Cohen’s d between  0.54 and 1.47.  Since this study will use a regression model, the 
more appropriate effect size measurement is Cohen’s f2.  Converting d to f2 yields a target 
range of approximately f2 = .06. to f2 = .56. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) to calculate the required sample size at an alpha of .05 at both values 
yields sample sizes of between 26 and 219.  ‘Splitting the difference’ gives a sample size 
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of 100, which was calculated to have a 95% chance of detecting an effect size of at least 
f2 =0.13.  Given that this sample is roughly twice as large as the most comparable studies 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Noël et al., 2006), which had samples of 42 and 64, 
respectively, and substantially larger than comparable research using erotic material 
(Prause et al., 2008, with a sample size of 81), this approach seems adequately 
conservative.  Given the speed of recruitment and the uncertainty associated with 
collecting data, sample sizes were doubled for recruitment purposes, with the goal of 
attaining a usable sample between 100 and 200.  The final sample, as described above, 
was 174. 
Data cleaning.  As with Noël et al., (2006), I eliminated any reaction times of 
greater than 2000 ms, as responses longer than that are clearly reflective of a distracted 
participant or a technical problem.  I also, again consistent with Noël’s procedure, 
eliminated reaction times that are more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean for 
each participant for each presentation time (calculated after eliminating any reactions 
over two seconds), and eliminated ‘incorrect’ trials in which the participant did not 
correctly identify on which side of the screen the dot appeared.  Note that this procedure 
varies only very slightly from the one used by Prause (2008) and described by Bush, Hess 
and Wolford (1993) in which each participant’s reaction times are z-scored and five 
percent trimmed within each person.  The net effect of either of the two procedures is 
almost identical; the only significant difference is that in the Noël et al. approach, 
reaction times that are faster than average but still correct are included, while the Bush, 
Hess and Wolford approach would exclude them. 
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There were 31,500 individual non-practice reaction times recorded.  Excluding 
reactions over 2,000 MS removed 301 trials, and excluding incorrect responses removed 
another 915 trials.  Excluding responses with faster than 2.5 standard deviations above 
each participants mean excluded another 601 trials.  The remaining 29,984 trials (or an 
average of approximately 500 trials per picture per response time) were reduced as 
below. 
Data reduction.  Consistent with both the Prause and the Noël et al. approaches, 
attentional bias scores for each participant for each presentation time were calculated by 
subtracting the mean response time for trials in which the dot was behind an erotic 
images from the mean response time for trials in which the dot was behind a neutral 
image.  Thus, an attentional bias toward erotic stimuli is reflected as a positive number.  
Each participant has three primary attentional bias scores – one for each presentation time 
(50 ms, 500 ms, 1,250 ms, named AB50, AB500 and AB1250).  Difference scores were 
then be calculated reflecting the difference in erotic attentional bias between each of the 
three time points – (D1) 50 ms – 500 ms; (D2) 500 ms – 1,250 ms; (D3) 50 ms – 1,250 ms.  
These three difference scores are thus higher if a person shows a greater attentional bias 
toward erotic images during fast presentations.  A zero for a difference score indicates 
that there was no difference between presentation speeds, and a negative number 
indicates a stronger erotic attentional bias for slower presentations. 
Data reduction formulas and nomenclature.  This is represented as below, with 
RTeijt being the reaction time for the ith correct response to the presentation of an erotic 
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image for participant j at presentation time t. Similarly, RTnijt is the reaction time for the 
ith correct response to the presentation of a neutral image for participant j at presentation 
time t.  The total number of correct responses to erotic images by participant j is cej, and 
the total number of correct responses to neutral images by participant j is cnj.  Thus the 
formula for the average correct response time to erotic (RTejt) and neutral (RTnjt) images 







The attentional bias for participant j at time t (ABjt) is thus: 
ܣܤ௝௧ ൌ 	ܴ ௡ܶ௝௧ െ	ܴ ௘ܶ௝௧ 
Since there are three time points (1 = 50 ms, 2 = 500 ms and 3 = 1,250 ms), there 
are three bias scores for each participant (ABj1, ABj2, ABj3, named as AB50, AB500 and 
AB1250 below and following), and three difference scores between the three attentional 
bias scores, with D1j being the difference in attentional bias between the fastest and the 
medium presentation speeds, D2j being the difference in attentional bias between the 
medium and slowest presentation speeds, and D3j being the difference in attentional bias 
between the fastest and the slowest presentation speeds, each for participant j: 
ܦ1௝ ൌ 	ܣܤ50௝ െ ܣܤ500௝ 
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ܦ2௝ ൌ 	ܣܤ500௝ െ ܣܤ1250௝ 
ܦ3௝ ൌ 	ܣܤ50௝ െ ܣܤ1250௝ 
Thus AB50, AB500 and AB1250 refer to the attentional bias scores at each of the 
three presentation times, and D1, D2 and D3 refer to the difference scores between the 
attentional bias scores at the three different presentation times.  This nomenclature is used 
below is describing the models to be tested. 
Hypothesis 1: Prause’s model of the relationship between desire and 
attentional bias will be supported.  Prause’s (2008) model posited that people with 
higher levels of sexual desire have a negative attentional bias toward sexual stimuli.  This 
was assessed through use of a series of regression models predicting attentional bias 
scores (described above) with sexual desire scores from the FSFI and IIEF.  As described 
above, gender, depression and anxiety scores from the BSI (Dep and Anx in the formulas 
below), as well as sexual function scores from the FSFI/IIEF and sexual satisfaction 
scores from the SSS-W (Fun and Sat, below) were covariates (shown in brackets) in the 
analysis. 
The regression models to test this hypothesis are as follows: 
Model 
1a. 
ܣܤ50 ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܦ݁ݏ ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 
1b. 
ܣܤ500 ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܦ݁ݏ ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 
1c. 




ܣܤ50 ൅ 	ܣܤ500 ൅ 	ܣܤ1250
3 ൌ 	ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܦ݁ݏ ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Prause’s study used reaction times pooled across multiple presentation times (500, 
750, 1,000 and 1,500 ms), and thus the hypothesis will be tested for each presentation 
time and for a pooled set of attentional biases across all presentation times, with the 
average across presentation times (Regression model 1d) the most direct replication of 
Prause’s findings.  If the regression models account for a significant portion of the 
variability in attentional bias and b1 is a significant contributor to the model, the data 
gathered on-line have replicated Prause’s results and Prause’s model will be supported.  
See Figure 4. 
Hypothesis 2: Distress will be associated with differences across attentional 
biases  Hypothesis 2 posits that the difference in attentional bias scores between times 
will be predictive of sexual distress.  That is, as with substance use (Noël et al., 2006) and 
phobias (Mogg & Bradley, 2006), I anticipated that one or more of the three difference 
scores (D1, D2 and D3) will be predictive of either sexual distress as measured by the 
FSDS-R or desire discrepancy distress as measured by the desire discrepancy items (DD 
Distress, below).  This was determined by use of a set of regression models predicting the 
continuous variable of sexual distress with each of the three difference scores, in six 
separate models as specified below.  As above, gender, depression, anxiety, sexual 
function and sexual satisfaction were entered in the model as covariates (Dep, Anx, Fun 
and Sat, respectively). 
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Model 2a.  ܨܵܦܵ஽௜௦௧௥௘௦௦ ൌ 	 ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ1 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 2b.  ܨܵܦܵ஽௜௦௧௥௘௦௦ ൌ 	 ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ2 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 2c.  ܨܵܦܵ஽௜௦௧௥௘௦௦ ൌ 	 ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ3 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 2d.  ܦܦ	ܦ݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ1 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 2e.  ܦܦ	ܦ݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ2 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
Model 2f.  ܦܦ	ܦ݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ ൌ 	ܾ଴ ൅	ܾଵܦ3 ൅ ሾܾଶܦ݁݌ ൅ ܾଷܣ݊ݔ ൅ ܾସܨݑ݊൅ܾହܵܽݐ ൅ ܾ଺ܩ݁݊݀ሿ 
If any or all of the models account for a significant portion of the variance and the 
b1 coefficient itself is a significant contributor to the model, the hypothesis is supported.  
See Figure 5. 
Because the measures of sexual function (the FSFI and the IIEF) are gender-
specific, and because these models call for a single measurement of sexual function 





See Table 4 and Table 5 for a breakdown of key variables by gender for the 174 
completers.  There were very few gender differences.  Men were more likely to report 
their sexual desire was higher than they wanted, (0.29 for men vs -0.09, for women), and 
men showed slightly higher erotophilia (5.20 for women vs. 5.54 for men, as measured 
by the SOS) and were significantly less likely to be in a romantic relationship (95.79% of 
women vs. 79.75% of men).    
See Table 6 for differences by gender and speed for the primary attentional 
measures (AB50, AB500, and AB1250) and Table 7 for difference in the primary 
difference scores (D1, D2, and D3) by gender and speed.  For all participants, AB50 was 
significantly different than AB500 and AB1250, and differences between AB500 and 
AB1250 were not significant.  That is, AB50 was significantly larger (more attentional 
bias toward the erotic) than either AB500 or AB1250 for men, women, and all 
participants.  D1 (AB50 – AB500) was not significantly different from D2 (AB 500 – 
AB1250) for men or women when considered separately, but was for all participants.  D3 
(AB50 – AB1250) was significantly different from D1 and D2 for men, and from D2 for 
women. 
See Table 8 for a review of the correlations, means, standard deviations, 
minimums, maximums, skewness and kurtosis for all primary study variables.  Note that 
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several study variables were meaningfully skewed (negatively skewed: SSS, SOS; 
positively skewed: FSDS, BSI Anxiety, BSI Depression, AB50, D1).  See Figure 6 
through Figure 24  for histograms of each variable of interest.  For the survey measures, 
this skewness reflects the relatively healthy nature of the sample.  For the attentional bias 
measures, this appears to reflect a general bias toward the erotic when presented quickly, 
which is broadly consistent with other studies (Prause, 2006; Prause et al., 2008).  These 
levels of skewness are not generally problematic (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), although 
transformations were conducted and tested (see below).  Similarly, several study 
variables had kurtosis measurement that differed meaningfully from zero (platykurtic: 
Age; leptokurtic: Desire discrepancy, SSS, BSI Anxiety, BSI Depression, SOS, AB50, 
AB1250, D1, D2, D3).  Although regression is, as a technique, not sensitive to the 
distribution of the variables themselves, requiring only that the residuals be normally 
distributed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), in every case where a highly skewed or 
kurtoticly-distorted variable was used in a regression model, log-transformations, 
inversion and reflections were used to test the value of a more normal distribution.  In 
every case, these transformations did not meaningfully alter the end result of the analysis 
in significance, direction or magnitude.  Thus, for ease of interpretation, the 
untransformed versions of each variable was used for all of the models described below. 
As shown in Table 8, correlations amongst study variables were run to determine 
if the study variables related to each other as expected.  The measures of sexual function, 
satisfaction and desire were highly correlated with each other, and in the expected 
directions.  For example, sexual satisfaction (as measured by the SSS) is highly 
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negatively correlated with sexual distress (as measured by both the FSDS and DDD) and 
positively correlated with sexual function (FSFI/IIEF).  Similarly, anxious and depressive 
symptoms (as measured by BSI Anxiety and BSI Depression) were negatively correlated 
with measures of satisfaction (SSS) and positively correlated with sexual function 
(FSFI/IIEF).  These relationships suggest that these participants as assessed by these 
techniques are relatively consistent with previous work. 
Amongst the less frequently used measures, erotophilia (as measured by the SOS) 
was, as makes intuitive sense, positively correlated with level of sexual desire (DD) and 
negatively correlated with ageiv.  Fundamentalism was positively correlated with age and 
negatively correlated with anxious symptomsv, but was not, as is discussed above, related 
to either attentional biases or attentional bias difference scores. 
Hypothesis 1 
Four hierarchical linear regression models were run to test Hypothesis 1.  The 
models varied only by the outcome variable.  In the first model, AB50 was predicted, 
while in the second AB500 was predicted, and in the third AB1250.  The fourth model – 
the most direct replication of Prause’s work – predicted the average of AB50, AB500 and 
AB1250.  In each model, variables were entered in an identical series of five steps.  In the 
first step, gender was added.  In step two, BSI Anxiety and BSI Depression were added, 
while step 3 added SSS and step 4 added the z-transformed version of the FSFI/IIEF 
scales that excluded the Desire subscales.  Step five added the z-scored FSFI/IIEF Desire 
subscale.  Detailed results of these models are shown in Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, and 
59 
Table 12.  None of the models as run predicted a significant amount of the variability in 
the relevant outcome variables, with r2 values all being under .04, or explaining roughly 
4% of the variability in the outcome variable.  Model 1, shown in Table 9 and predicting 
ABAll has an r2 of .04,  while for Model 2, shown in Table 10 and predicting AB50, r2 = 
.03, for Model 3, shown in Table 11 and predicting AB500, r2 = .01, and for Model 4, 
shown in Table 12 and predicting AB1250, r2 = .02.  Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
Six hierarchical linear regression models were run to test Hypothesis 2 in two sets 
of three.  Each model predicted one of the attentional bias difference scores (D1, D2, or 
D3) using a number of covariates and distress, either measured by FSDS or DDD.  The 
first set predicted FSDS, while the second set predicted DDD.  The first step of the 
regression models are identical for each set, with Gender, BSI Anxiety, BSI Depression, 
SSS, the FSFI/IIEF (excluding Desire) z-scored measure, SOS and Fundamentalism 
added. Within each set, one model was run with the fifth step adding D1, another with D2 
and the third with D3.  See Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, and Table 
18 for details. 
Within each set of models, the first step of each regression model is identical, 
varying only with the addition of the attentional bias difference score in the final step.  
The first set of models all strongly predicted FSDS, with r2 values of approximately 0.75 
for each of the three models.  However, as is shown in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15, 
the addition of the attentional bias difference score in Step 2 did not meaningfully 
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improve any of the models, with ∆r2 values for Step 2 all rounding to 0.00, and none of 
the three difference scores significantly predicting FSDS in any of the final models.  
Anxious and depressive symptoms (BSI Anxiety and BSI Depression) were both 
positively related to distress (more anxious or depressive symptoms was related to more 
distress), while erotophilia (SOS) was negatively related to distress (more erotophila was 
related to less distress). 
The second set of models all predicted DDD, with r2 values of approximately 
0.29 for each of the three models.  Note that the majority of respondents indicated a 
Desire Distress Discrepancy (DDD) of zero, meaning that they were happy with their 
level of sexual desire.  These models were run twice, one using all respondents and once 
using only respondents who had a response to desire discrepancy other than zero.  The 
models did not vary significantly in magnitude or sign of coefficients, and for ease of 
interpretation, the models shown are those that included all respondents.  As is shown in 
Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18, the addition of the attentional bias difference score in 
Step 2 did not meaningfully improve any of the models, with ∆R2 values for Step 5 all 
rounding to 0.00, and none of the three difference scores significantly predicted DDD in 
any of the final models.  Effectively all of the variability accounted for by each model is 
captured by the relationship between sexual satisfaction (SSS) and desire discrepancy 
distress (DDD), with more satisfaction being related with less distress. 
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Although the models run to test Hypothesis 2 all meaningfully predicted distress, 
whether measured by FSDS or DDD, none of the attentional variables added measurably 
to the model.  Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Secondary analyses 
A number of secondary analyses were run, both planned and ad hoc.  These 
analyses served one of two purposes.  First, they expanded on the analyses conducted to 
test the hypotheses to diagnose whether the lack of support is reflective of the data or of 
an insufficiently sophisticated data analytic plan.  Second, they tested relationships and 
models related to the primary hypotheses but not directly involving the variables of 
primary interest. 
Diagnostic and exploratory analyses.  As described above, each participant 
(including those who did not complete the cognitive task, although those participants are 
obviously excluded from these analyses) rated each erotic image used on a scale from 
zero to four, with four being the most erotic.  As shown in Table 4, participants rated 
about half of the images used either a three or four and about one quarter of the images 
used a four.  By recreating the attentional bias and bias difference scores using only the 
images rated a three or four (e.g., AB5034, AB50034, AB125034) or four (e.g., AB504, 
AB5004, AB12504) and re-calculating some key relationships with study variables, I 
attempted to determine if the relationships became stronger if only the images that each 
individual participant rated as somewhat (xx34) or very (xx4) erotic was used. 
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First, a series of paired sample t-tests were run to see if the attentional biases 
using the more erotic images were significantly different than the attentional biases using 
all of the images.   See Table 19.  Even though this result suggests that further analysis is 
not warranted, due to the high level of noise in the attentional bias data, another more 
subjective test was used.  Limitations to this test include that there is an obvious 
reduction in power and reliability, since either 50% or 25% of the original trials were 
used, and some potential issues with self-selection, since participants rated a different 
number of images highly, and those who rated images more highly generally may be 
inherently more erotophillic.  In addition, there is not an established statistical test to 
confirm that these relationships are getting stronger, given the difficulties associated with 
assessing a difference between difference scores based on averaged difference scores.  
Nevertheless, a visual indication of a reliable intensification in relationship strength 
would be consistent with the notion that the relationship is dependent on the erotic-ness 
of the image.  Correlations were run for the attentional biases and difference scores and 
DD, DDD and FSDS for each of the three levels of erotic images (all images, 3 and 4 
only, 4 only).  See Figure 25 through Figure 30 for graphs of these changes for AB50, 
AB500 and AB1250 and D1, D2 and D3.  The interpretation of these graphs is inherently 
subjective.  While some graphs seem to show a clear directional relationship (e.g., 
AB500 and AB1250, and FSDS and DDD for D2 and D3), the pattern was not consistent 
or unambiguous enough to support further analysis, particularly in the context of the 
paired sample t-tests.  In addition, the correlations involved remain very small and 
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consistently clustered around zero.  For that reason, no further analyses of attentional 
biases or difference scores using image-restricted data was attempted. 
Fundamentalism.  As discussed, fundamentalism was theorized to be related to 
distress about sexuality.  Although there has been relatively little research about the 
relationship between fundamentalism and sexual function, satisfaction and distress, the 
existing research broadly supports the idea that religious beliefs are not connected with 
sexual function (e.g., Filocamo et al., 2014), but that fundamentalism is broadly 
associated with reported sexual behaviors (Farmer, Trapnell, & Meston, 2009).   
Relationships between fundamentalism and other study variables.  Given the 
exploratory nature of these analyses, simple correlations were run to test whether 
fundamentalism was related to other study variables in the expected direction.  As seen in 
Table 8, fundamentalism was positively correlated with age (r = .22, p = .01) and 
negatively correlated with erotophila (r = -.38, p < .01) and anxious symptoms (r = -.16,  
p = .03).  This suggests that older participants (even within the restricted band of ages 
tested) had more fundamentalist beliefs, and that more fundamentalist participants were 
less likely to be pro-sexuality (SOS) and had fewer anxious symptoms.  Also consistent 
with existing research, fundamentalism was not found to be related to sexual function 
(FSFI/IIEF) or satisfaction (SSS).     
Mediating effects of Fundamentalism.  First tested was a model that tested 
whether the relationship between attentional bias (AB50, AB500 and AB1250) and 
sexual distress (FSDS) was mediated by fundamentalism (Fund).  Although the main 
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effect has already been implicitly tested as part of the primary hypotheses, these 
mediation model tests the possibility of suppression, or the possibility that the direct and 
indirect effects countered each other, producing a net main effect of zero.  Using 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2012), three mediation models were run predicting FSDS with AB50, 
AB500 and AB1250, respectively and independent, with Fundamentalism mediating the 
relationship.  For AB50, the model did not predict a significant about of variability, r2 = 
.02, p = .78.  The bootstrapped standardized indirect effect was 0.00 (95% CI -0.03, 
0.02), and the bootstrapped direct effect was -0.01 (95% CI -0.01, 0.01).  Similarly, the 
model using AB500 did not predict a significant amount of variability, r2 = .11, p = .33.  
The bootstrapped standardized indirect effect was 0.00 (95% CI -.01, 0.04), and the 
bootstrapped direct effect was -0.01 (95% CI -0.07, 0.04).  Finally, the model using 
AB1250 also did not predict a significant amount of variability, r2 = .11, p = .36.  The 
bootstrapped indirect effect was -0.01 (95% CI -0.05, 0.01), and the bootstrapped direct 
effect was -0.01 (95% CI -0.06, 0.05).  There was not sufficient evidence to suggest that 




The central research question at its most basic is: does a conflict in fast and slow 
attentional responses to the erotic relate to sexual distress?  This hypothesized 
relationship is premised in part on the idea that subjective or psychological sexual desire 
plays out through attention; that sexual desire consists of the application of a cognitive 
schema that preferences the erotic meaning of a stimulus over the non-erotic meanings 
(Janssen et al., 2000).  Thus, a functioning cognitive mechanism for sexual arousal turns 
attention toward the more erotic and away from the non-erotic during sexual arousal.  
This work is theorized to operate on both automatic and conscious levels (Janssen et al., 
2000; Prause et al., 2008).  That conflict is the heart of this study: are conflicting fast and 
slow sexual responses associated with internally conflicting responses to the sexual, and 
thus related to distress about sexuality?    
There were two hypotheses tested.  Hypothesis 1 sought to replicate Prause’s 
2006 work which found a relationship between sexual desire and attentional bias away 
from erotic stimuli.  Hypothesis 2 proposed that a discrepancy between fast and slow 
attentional biases toward erotic stimuli would predict distress about sexuality, whether 
that distress was about sexuality generally or was distress about a discrepancy between 
the level of sexual desire the participant had and the level of sexual desire the participant 
wanted.  Neither hypothesis was supported by these data.  Secondary and post-hoc 
analyses were used to explore these findings, but these additional findings also did not 
support the primary hypotheses. 
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These results are discussed below.  First, I consider that these hypotheses were 
not supported because the relationships and mechanisms they imply are not real, and 
second I explore whether there could be methodological issues that prevented this 
particular study from finding these effects.  Both possibilities are considered in the 
proposal of future research. 
Speculation: The effect is not real 
The first possibility to consider is that the reason this effect was not found is 
because it does not exist.  While there certainly were people with significant differences 
between fast attention to the erotic (AB50) and slow attention to the erotic (AB1250), as 
seen in the distribution of D3 (AB50 – AB1250), as shown in Figure 24, that difference 
was not correlated with any of the other study variablesvi.  However, the differences 
between the attentional biases were as expected, with a stronger positive attentional bias 
toward the erotic at 50ms than at 1250ms.  That is, there is evidence that these data are 
capturing attentional biases toward the erotic as they were intended to do. 
Combining that with the evidence that using only trials involving images rated as 
more erotic does not consistently increase the effects, these results are consistent with the 
idea that differences in attentional biases toward the erotic, regardless of how erotic the 
images are, are not associated with distress.  Since Janssen’s attentional theory of desire 
is consistent with other theories of emotion and memory (Frijda, 1988, 1993; Janssen et 
al., 2000) and has been supported by empirical data in over 100 studies (see Chivers, 
Rieger, Latty, & Bailey, 2004; H. A. Rupp & Wallen, 2007; H. Rupp & Wallen, 2008; P. 
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Smith & Waterman, 2004 for example), it is more likely that this study has misapplied 
that theory than that it demonstrated a limitation of the theory.  In either case, the solution 
is further research. 
These questions should be explored using the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP, Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Levin, Hayes, & Waltz, 2010), which has 
the ability to test implicit cognitive congruence with propositional statements (e.g., “I 
want to be a sexual person,” or “I am distressed by my desire”) by measuring reaction 
time when assessing whether that statement is true or false for the respondentvii.  In this 
case, such a measure can be used to identify the aspects of sexual distress that are most 
implicitly salient – for example, whether the physical experience of arousal is itself 
distressing, or if there are memories associated with arousal that are distressing.  By 
better exploring the meaning of sexual distress, this future research can explicate the 
phenomenon of sexual distress.   
Speculation: The effect is real, but was not found 
Methodology: Data collection.  This study was novel not only in the question 
being asked but in the application of an existing (but relatively new) data collection 
methodology to sexuality research.  Mechanical Turk is widely used in the collection of 
survey data (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2012) and work has demonstrated 
Mechanical Turk’s effectiveness in the conduct of precision-timed tasks by replicating 
classic cognitive ‘effects,’ albeit with slightly smaller effect sizes (Crump et al., 2013).  
In fact, 23 articles citing Inquisit (and thus capturing precision-timed data) and using 
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Mechanical Turk as a participant source were published between January, 2014 and 
April, 2015viii. However, as discussed above, conducting an experiment in 400 different 
homes instead of a single laboratory must of necessity reduce standardization in a number 
of ways.  Most of the existing research has suggested that decrease in standardization is 
outweighed by the ease and speed of recruitment, but that might be less true than 
previously believed. 
Very recent work (Schatz, 2015) suggests that variability in computer hardware 
will add more noise than previously estimated to the data collection.  Although Inquisit 
collects significant information about the computer hardware being used, not enough is 
known about the effects of specific hardware and software configuration to be able to 
attempt to either exclude participants with particularly ‘noisy’ hardware or correct for 
that variability.  This is consistent with previous findings that effect sizes are generally 
smaller when data from cognitive tasks are collected via Mechanical Turk. 
Methodology: Sample selection.  Of necessity, only those who are comfortable 
completing a sexually-explicit task are willing to complete such a task.  This is an 
inherent limitation in data collection in sexuality research, and it means that researchers 
are likely gathering data from participants who are more comfortable with their sexuality 
than the general population.  That alone may mask the hypothesized effect.  In this case, 
however, we have additional information.  Since the study involved both survey data and 
a cognitive task, with a hidden qualification gate between the two, there is additional 
information about who qualified and who did not.  After application of the inclusion and 
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exclusion criteria, participants were offered a chance to complete the study.  The vast 
majority of those offered the chance took it, but there were a number of important 
differences between those who met criteria and those who did not.  In particular, those 
who did not qualify and/or did not choose to complete the task reported lower levels of 
sexual desire, more distress about their sexual desire, less sexual satisfaction, more 
general sexual distress, and were more anxious and depressed.  In addition, they rated the 
images as less erotic overall (See Table 2 and Table 3).  Many of these variables are 
central to the research question, and these differences represent a significant confound.  
By excluding participants with higher levels of general sexual dysfunction, for example, 
this study may have excluded those participants with higher levels of distress about 
sexuality. 
The net result is that these methodological uncertainties mean that this null 
finding is as likely to represent the limitations of the way the study was conducted as it is 
to suggest the hypothesized effect does not exist. 
Future research 
This uncertainty presents a clear direction for future research.  Whether the reason 
the hypotheses were not supported is because of a technical or sample selection 
methodological limitation or because the effect is not as theorized, future work is 
required to increase certainty.  One line of that work should use the same surveys and dot 
probe task, ideally with the same set of stimuli, but should (a) be conducted in a 
laboratory setting, using computer hardware with known performance characteristics, (b) 
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use fewer exclusion criteria, including not excluding participants based on sexual 
function (or lack thereof).  Under these circumstances, the results from a similarly 
powered study could be compared directly to these results. 
To further explore the theory underlying this study, a measure such as the IRAP 
(discussed above) could be used to explore the implicit meaning associated with desire 
and distress.  The IRAP can, with its subtler ability to test for implicit agreement with 
more complex propositional statements such as “I want to be a sexual being,” or “I find 
my sexuality distressing,” tell us more about the implicit structure of the phenomenal 
experience of distress and desire.    
Conclusion 
The study hypotheses were not supported, but there is insufficient information in 
these results to suggest either that this lack of support is due to a flaw in the theory or a 
limitation of the approach.  If the former, research using techniques such as the IRAP to 
better understand the phenomenology of sexual distress can help explicate how distress 
itself is experienced.  If the latter, future research, replicating this study with a broader 
sample under more controlled conditions, could help resolve that question. 
Although this study did not produce firm conclusions, it did produce a set of clear 
recommendations for future research to better understand the phenomenon of sexual 
distress.   
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Columns not sharing a superscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
Completed task: 
Criterion J: Sexual function 
is above cut-off 
Criterion I: Penetrative sex 
in the last four weeks 
Criterion H: Either 
exclusively or 
predominately heterosexual 
Criterion A: Age between 
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Did not complete 
task   Completed task   All participants 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Age 30.46a 5.88  30.08a 3.23  30.29 4.89 
Number of 
children 0.55a 1.03  0.71a 1.17  0.62 1.09 
Income $49,213a 32,934  $49,482a $27,972   $49,332 $30,804 
Sexual desire 
higher or lower -0.29a 0.94  0.08b 0.73  -0.13 0.87 
Desire distress 
discrepancy 0.48a 1.07  0.02b 0.85  0.28 1 
SSS Full Scale 106.18a 30.01  127.81b 18.88  116.66 27.43 
FSDS Full 
Scale 15.53a 11.08  8.92b 8.65  12.37 10.51 
BSI Anxiety 3.90a 4.42  2.08b 2.75  3.05 3.84 
BSI Depression 5.32a 5.73  2.82b 3.56  4.14 4.98 
BSI Somatic 2.44a 3.65  1.25b 1.95  1.88 3.03 
SOS Full Scale 4.95a 1.57  5.35b 1.08  5.14 1.37 
Fundamentalism 
Full Scale 40.24a 26.34  41.74a 27.62  40.94 26.92 
All images 2.50a 0.95  2.53a 0.78  2.52 0.87 
# of images 
rated 3 or 4 10.37a 7.22  11.78b 5.71  10.99 6.63 
# of images 
rated 4 4.30a 5.23  4.88a 4.79  4.55 5.04 







complete task   Completed task   
All Participants 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
 N %  N %  N % 
Relationship status         
Not in relationship 69a 31.08%  20b 11.49%  89 22.47% 
In relationship 153a 68.92%  154b 88.51%  307 77.53% 
         
Education         
High school or less 31a 14.09%  21a 12.14%  52 13.23% 
Some college 89a 40.45%  69a 39.88%  158 40.20% 
College 81a 36.82%  71a 41.04%  152 38.68% 
Advanced degree 19a 8.64%   12a 6.94%   31 7.89% 




  Female  Male  All participants 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Age 30.42a 3.02  29.67a 3.44  30.08 3.23 
# children .81a 1.16  .59a 1.17  0.71 1.17 
Income 49,947a 26,670  48,924a 29,625  49,482 27,972 
Sexual desire 
+/- -.09a 0.72  .29b 0.7  0.08 0.73 
Desire distress 
disc. .06a 0.87  -.03a 0.82  0.02 0.85 
SSS Full Scale 128.75a 18.81  126.69a 19.01  127.81 18.88 
FSDS Full Scale 8.80a 8.66  9.06a 8.69  8.92 8.65 
BSI Anxiety 1.96a 2.79  2.23a 2.71  2.08 2.75 
BSI Depression 2.61a 3.65  3.06a 3.44  2.82 3.56 
BSI Somatic 1.21a 1.95  1.29a 1.96  1.25 1.95 
SOS Full Scale 5.20a 1.12  5.54b 1.00  5.35 1.08 
Fundamentalism 42.65a 28.45  40.62a 26.72  41.74 27.62 
All images 2.49a 0.78  2.58a 0.78  2.53 0.78 
Explicit images 2.67a 1.01  2.91a 0.89  2.78 0.96 
Mild images 2.30a 0.81  2.20a 0.86  2.26 0.83 
Images rated 3 
or 4 11.57a 5.85  12.04a 5.57  11.78 5.71 
Images rated 4 4.61a 4.57  5.20a 5.04  4.88 4.79 
AB50 25.81a 29.38  18.32a 28.3  22.41 29.05 
AB500 10.00a 24.01  6.26a 24.38  8.3 24.18 












19.99a 37.51  15.64a 39.71  18.01 38.47 
Columns not sharing a superscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
90 
Table	5. Differences by gender in categorical study variables. 
 Count %  Count %  Count % 
Relationship status         
Not in relationship 4a 4.21%  16b 20.25%  20 11.49% 
In relationship 91a 95.79%  63b 79.75%  154 88.51% 
         
Ethnicity         
Caucasian 75a 78.95%  62a 78.48%  137 78.74% 
African American 7a 7.37%  7a 8.86%  14 8.05% 
Asian 5a 5.26%  3a 3.80%  8 4.60% 
Hispanic 7a 7.37%  4a 5.06%  11 6.02% 
Multiple 1a 1.05%  3a 3.80%  4 2.30% 
         
Education         
High school or less 8a 8.51%  13a 16.46%  21 12.14% 
Some college 42a 44.68%  27a 34.18%  69 39.88% 
College 35a 37.23%  36a 45.57%  71 41.04% 
Advanced degree 9a 9.57%   3a 3.80%   12 6.94% 
Columns not sharing a superscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
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Table	6. Differences in attentional biases by speed and gender. 
 AB50  AB500  AB1250 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
All participants (n = 174) 22.41a 29.06  8.30b 24.18  4.39b 24.28 
Men (n = 79) 18.32a 28.30  6.26b 24.38  2.68b 23.18 
Women (n = 95) 25.81a 29.38  10.00b 24.01  5.82b 25.19 
Columns not sharing a superscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
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Table	7. Differences in attentional bias difference scores by speed and gender. 
 D1  D2  D3 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
All participants (n = 174) 14.10a 36.38  3.91b   29.99  18.01a 38.47 
Men (n = 79) 12.05a 39.36  3.58a 29.75  15.63b 39.71 
Women (n = 95) 15.81a,b 33.82  4.18a 30.35  19.99b 37.51 




  *= p < .05; ** = p <
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Table	9. FSFI/IIEF Desire does not predict average attentional bias (ABAll). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .04    .51 
Constant  14.53 12.65  0.25 
Gender  -4.94 2.60 -0.15 0.06 
BSI Anx  0.04 0.58 0.01 0.95 
BSI Dep  -0.56 0.50 -0.12 0.26 
SSS  -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.87 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -0.27 7.51 0.00 0.97 
SOS  0.51 1.30 0.03 0.69 
Fundamentalism  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.71 
      
Step 2 .003    .473 
Constant  13.12 12.82  0.31 
Gender  -5.06 2.61 -0.16 0.05 
BSI Anx  0.03 0.58 0.00 0.96 
BSI Dep  -0.54 0.50 -0.12 0.28 
SSS  -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.94 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  0.63 7.62 0.01 0.94 
SOS  0.57 1.30 0.04 0.66 
Fundamentalism  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.71 
FSFI/IIEF Desire (z)  -1.26 1.75 -0.06 0.47 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	10. FSFI/IIEF Desire does not predict attentional bias at 50ms (AB50). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .03    .68 
Constant  3.47 23.02  0.88 
Gender  -7.31 4.72 -0.13 0.12 
BSI Anx  -0.60 1.06 -0.06 0.58 
BSI Dep  0.10 0.91 0.01 0.92 
SSS  0.17 0.18 0.11 0.36 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -9.30 13.65 -0.08 0.50 
SOS  1.31 2.36 0.05 0.58 
Fundamentalism  0.03 0.09 0.03 0.73 
      
Step 2 .00    .78 
Constant  4.49 23.36  0.85 
Gender  -7.23 4.75 -0.12 0.13 
BSI Anx  -0.59 1.06 -0.06 0.58 
BSI Dep  0.08 0.91 0.01 0.93 
SSS  0.16 0.18 0.10 0.38 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -9.95 13.88 -0.08 0.47 
SOS  1.27 2.37 0.05 0.60 
Fundamentalism  0.03 0.09 0.03 0.73 
FSFI/IIEF Desire (z)  0.91 3.19 0.02 0.78 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	11. FSFI/IIEF Desire does not predict attentional bias at 500ms (AB500). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .06    .22 
Constant  46.22 18.78  0.02 
Gender  -4.35 3.86 -0.09 0.26 
BSI Anx  0.73 0.87 0.08 0.40 
BSI Dep  -1.57 0.74 -0.23 0.04 
SSS  -0.27 0.15 -0.21 0.07 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  14.07 11.14 0.14 0.21 
SOS  -0.89 1.93 -0.04 0.64 
Fundamentalism  -0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.57 
      
Step 2 .00    .55 
Constant  44.48 19.05  0.02 
Gender  -4.49 3.87 -0.09 0.25 
BSI Anx  0.72 0.87 0.08 0.41 
BSI Dep  -1.54 0.74 -0.23 0.04 
SSS  -0.26 0.15 -0.20 0.08 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  15.17 11.32 0.15 0.18 
SOS  -0.82 1.94 -0.04 0.67 
Fundamentalism  -0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.58 
FSFI/IIEF Desire (z)  -1.55 2.60 -0.05 0.55 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	12. FSFI/IIEF Desire does not predict attentional bias at 1,250ms (AB1250). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .01    .96 
Constant  -6.09 19.58  0.76 
Gender  -3.16 4.02 -0.06 0.43 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.90 0.00 0.98 
BSI Dep  -0.21 0.77 -0.03 0.78 
SSS  0.06 0.15 0.05 0.70 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -5.57 11.61 -0.06 0.63 
SOS  1.12 2.01 0.05 0.58 
Fundamentalism  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.40 
      
Step 2 .01    .25 
Constant  -9.61 19.79  0.63 
Gender  -3.46 4.02 -0.07 0.39 
BSI Anx  -0.05 0.90 -0.01 0.95 
BSI Dep  -0.15 0.77 -0.02 0.84 
SSS  0.08 0.15 0.06 0.61 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -3.34 11.76 -0.03 0.78 
SOS  1.26 2.01 0.05 0.53 
Fundamentalism  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.39 
FSFI/IIEF Desire (z)  -3.14 2.70 -0.10 0.25 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	13. D1 (AB50 – AB500) does not predict FSDS Distress. 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .76    .00 
Constant  44.60 3.43  0.00 
Gender  -0.66 0.70 -0.04 0.35 
BSI Anx  0.30 0.16 0.10 0.06 
BSI Dep  0.41 0.14 0.17 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.66 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.98 2.03 -0.08 0.14 
SOS  0.77 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.54 
      
Step 2 .00    .44 
Constant  44.91 3.46  0.00 
Gender  -0.64 0.71 -0.04 0.37 
BSI Anx  0.31 0.16 0.10 0.05 
BSI Dep  0.40 0.14 0.16 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.67 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.81 2.05 -0.08 0.17 
SOS  0.76 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.52 
D1  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.44 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	14. D2 (AB500 – AB1250) does not predict FSDS Distress. 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .76    .00 
Constant  44.60 3.43  0.00 
Gender  -0.66 0.70 -0.04 0.35 
BSI Anx  0.30 0.16 0.10 0.06 
BSI Dep  0.41 0.14 0.17 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.66 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.98 2.03 -0.08 0.14 
SOS  0.77 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.54 
      
Step 2 .00    .65 
Constant  44.88 3.49  0.00 
Gender  -0.67 0.71 -0.04 0.35 
BSI Anx  0.31 0.16 0.10 0.06 
BSI Dep  0.40 0.14 0.17 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.67 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.88 2.05 -0.08 0.16 
SOS  0.76 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.52 
D1  -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.65 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	15. D3 (AB50 – AB1250) does not predict FSDS Distress. 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .76    .00 
Constant  44.60 3.43  0.00 
Gender  -0.66 0.70 -0.04 0.35 
BSI Anx  0.30 0.16 0.10 0.06 
BSI Dep  0.41 0.14 0.17 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.66 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.98 2.03 -0.08 0.14 
SOS  0.77 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.54 
      
Step 2 .00    .71 
Constant  44.57 3.44  0.00 
Gender  -0.65 0.71 -0.04 0.36 
BSI Anx  0.30 0.16 0.10 0.06 
BSI Dep  0.41 0.14 0.17 0.00 
SSS  -0.31 0.03 -0.66 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -2.97 2.04 -0.08 0.15 
SOS  0.77 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Fundamentalism  -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.55 
D3  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.71 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	16. D1 (AB50 – AB500) does not predict desire discrepancy distress (DDD). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .29    .00 
Constant  2.66 0.57  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.20 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.08 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.73 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
      
Step 2 .00    .95 
Constant  2.65 0.58  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.21 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.09 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.74 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
D1  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.95 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	17. D2 (AB500 – AB1250) does not predict desire discrepancy distress 
(DDD). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .29    .00 
Constant  2.66 0.57  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.20 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.08 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.73 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
      
Step 2 .00    .95 
Constant  2.65 0.58  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.21 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.09 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.74 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
D2  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.95 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	18. D3 (AB50 – AB1250) does not predict desire discrepancy distress (DDD). 
 ∆R2 B SE B β P 
Step 1 .29    .00 
Constant  2.66 0.57  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.20 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct w/o Desire (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.08 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.73 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
      
Step 2 .00    .630 
Constant  2.65 0.58  0.00 
Gender  -0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.28 
BSI Anx  -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.53 
BSI Dep  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.21 
SSS  -0.02 0.00 -0.42 0.00 
SexFunct (z)  -0.29 0.34 -0.09 0.39 
SOS  -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.74 
Fundamentalism  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.66 
D3  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.63 
*= p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table	19. Paired-sample t-tests comparing attentional biases calculated using all 
images to those which used only images rated highly (34) or very highly (4) erotic 
demonstrate no significant differences. 
 Mean SD t df p 
AB50 - AB5034 -1.08 19.18 -0.71 160 0.48 
AB50 - AB504 -5.57 41.46 -1.43 112 0.16 
AB5034 - AB504 -4.09 36.69 -1.19 112 0.24 
AB500 - AB50034 -0.80 23.68 -0.43 161 0.67 
AB500 - AB5004 -2.18 42.45 -0.55 112 0.59 
AB50034 - AB5004 -1.87 40.36 -0.49 112 0.62 
AB1250 - AB125034 -1.57 25.17 -0.80 162 0.43 
AB1250 - AB12504 4.71 53.51 0.96 117 0.34 
AB125034 - AB12504 5.42 44.84 1.31 117 0.19 




Figure 1.	 The relationship between erotic stimuli, cognitive schema and Type 1 and 
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Figure 1. The relationship between erotic stimuli, cognitive schema and Type 1 and 











Figure 3. Hypothesis 2: Conflicting attentional biases are hypothesized to be 














































































































Figure 25. Differences in AB50 as calculated using all images (AB50), only images 













Figure 26. Differences in AB500 as calculated using all images (AB500), only 


















Figure 27. Differences in AB1250 as calculated using all images (AB1250), only 

















Figure 28. Differences in D1 (AB50 – AB500) as calculated using all images (D1), 













Figure 29. Differences in D2 (AB500 – AB1250) as calculated using all images (D2), 

















Figure 30. Differences in D3 (AB50 – AB1250) as calculated using all images (D3), 



































                                                 
